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NEUTRAL NO MORE: SECONDARY EFFECTS
ANALYSIS AND THE QUIET DEMISE OF THE
CONTENT-NEUTRALITY TEST
Mark Rienzi* & Stuart Buck**
When the Supreme Court introduced the “secondary effects” doctrine to
allow for zoning of adult businesses, critics fell into two camps. Some, like
Justice William Brennan, predicted dire consequences for the First
Amendment, particularly if the doctrine was used in political speech cases.
Others, like Professor Laurence Tribe, predicted secondary effects analysis
would be limited to sexually explicit speech and would not threaten the
First Amendment. The modern consensus is that the doctrine has, in fact,
been limited to cases about sex.
Recent cases demonstrate, however, that the impact of the secondary
effects doctrine on the First Amendment has been broader and more
insidious than is generally understood. It is true that courts usually avoid
expressly invoking the doctrine outside the adult speech context, instead
applying the standard content-neutrality analysis. But that “standard”
neutrality analysis has actually been quietly warped over the past three
decades by the influence of the secondary effects doctrine. These doctrinal
distortions have occurred without anything like the outcry generated by the
prospect of express use of the doctrine in political speech cases.
The results of this doctrinal shift are striking, with some courts treating
as “neutral” laws that deliberately discriminate among speakers and
messages on public sidewalks, in issuing parade permits, and even in what
political messages can be worn on T-shirts.
This Article (1) describes the manner in which the standard neutrality
analysis has been warped by the secondary effects doctrine,
(2) demonstrates the dangerous First Amendment effects of those changes
by examining several recent cases in which courts have allowed contentbased or even viewpoint-based speech restrictions to stand, and
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(3) explains how the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts can and should
correct this serious First Amendment problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly three decades ago, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
the U.S. Supreme Court introduced the “secondary effects” doctrine into the
First Amendment’s content-neutrality analysis.1 Under this doctrine, the
Court upheld a law imposing zoning requirements on an adult-themed
movie theater as “content neutral,” even though application of the law
turned entirely on the content of movies shown.2
The decision was greeted with sky-is-falling pronouncements of the
danger to the First Amendment. Justice William Brennan wrote that the
“dangers and difficulties posed by the Renton analysis are extensive”
because “secondary effects offer countless excuses for content-based
suppression of political speech.”3 Geoffrey Stone observed that the
doctrine “threaten[ed] to undermine the very foundation of the contentbased/content-neutral distinction” and “in turn erode the coherence and
predictability of first amendment doctrine.”4
Renton offered a possible silver lining—perhaps the secondary effects
doctrine would be limited to sexually explicit speech, and therefore not
endanger the political speech that lies at the core of the First Amendment’s
protections. At the time, Laurence Tribe wrote, “The Renton view will
likely prove to be an aberration limited to the context of sexually explicit
materials.”5 Kathleen Sullivan expressed the same view years later,
explaining that the secondary effects doctrine is used in the context of
sexually explicit speech to “uphold otherwise content-based statutes whose
Modern
political counterparts would readily be struck down.”6
commentary suggests most scholars agree that the secondary effects
doctrine has been largely cabined to sexually explicit speech.7
1. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
2. See id. at 54–55.
3. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
4. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 116–
17 (1987); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and
Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 293 n.145 (1987) (“[I]f taken seriously as a
statement of first amendment law, [Renton] would effectively eviscerate the concepts of
‘time, place and manner,’ ‘content neutrality,’ and ‘narrow tailoring.’ It is reasonable to
hope that the distortions introduced in that opinion will apply only to the category of
‘sexually explicit materials’ . . . .”); Andrea Oser, Motivation Analysis in Light of Renton, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 344, 350 (1987) (noting that commentators “fear that Renton marks a
gutting of the first amendment”).
5. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-3, at 799 n.17 (2d ed.
1988); see also Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the Municipal Land Use
Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 95 (1988) (“Although the Court never explicitly
affirms the view that sexually explicit expression is a generally less valuable form of speech
(and that the plurality position in American Mini Theatres now commands a majority of the
Court), no other explanation of Renton is plausible. The protection provided the regulated
speech in Renton is so limited and so easily circumscribed that the case’s holding must be
narrowly construed.”).
6. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sex, Money, and Groups: Free Speech and Association
Decisions in the October 1999 Term, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 730 (2001).
7. See, e.g., Joshua P. Davis & Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Inherent Structure of Free
Speech Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 131, 137 (2010) (“[T]he ‘secondary effects’ test
is best understood as a way to give sexual speech less protection than more highly valued
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The core claim of this Article is that this dominant view is wrong.
Although courts have generally avoided express use of the secondary
effects doctrine in political speech cases, the doctrine has had a powerful
distorting effect on the traditional content-neutrality analysis that lies at the
heart of much of the Court’s free speech analysis. These changes to the
traditional neutrality test have created precisely the First Amendment
problems feared by Renton’s early critics. Yet they have done so rather
stealthily, without anything like the attention initially attracted by Renton
itself, and without any of the outcry that would have accompanied the
widespread express use of the secondary effects doctrine in political speech
cases.
The result is that courts today are more likely to uphold expressly
content-based restrictions on core political speech—and even viewpointbased8 restrictions on such speech—than they were before Renton. In the
past few years, this has resulted in federal courts deeming “neutral”
government attempts to discriminate among speakers based on their
messages on public streets and sidewalks, in parade permitting schemes,
and even in which political T-shirts they may wear.9
We believe three doctrinal developments are responsible for this shift.
First, the very existence of the secondary effects doctrine suggests to courts
and governments that, at least in some instances, a law can be deemed
neutral and acceptable if it has a neutral purpose, even if the application of
the law itself is actually content based. This occurs primarily, but not
exclusively, in cases concerning sex-related speech.
Second, courts historically required a law to be “justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech” before it could be treated
as content neutral.10 When properly applied, this inquiry requires a critical
review of the government’s asserted interest to determine whether that
interest is related to content in any way.11 Over time, and in reliance on
Renton, courts have largely deemed the “justification” inquiry satisfied any
time a government even names a neutral interest, regardless of whether the
justification is triggered only by speech of a particular content. This change
makes the “justified without reference” prong of content analysis virtually
powerless to protect against selective government regulation of speech,
even in the realm of political speech.

speech.”); John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291,
293 (2009) (“The good news . . . is that courts generally do not apply the secondary effects
doctrine to most forms of protected speech.”).
8. As the Supreme Court has explained, viewpoint discrimination is “an egregious form
of content discrimination.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829 (1995) (“When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by
speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.
Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.” (citing
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992))).
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976).
11. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).
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Third, relying on Renton, the Supreme Court has declared on several
occasions that the search for an illicit governmental motive is the “principal
inquiry” in content-neutrality analysis.12 Lower courts have taken this
claim quite seriously. This often results in courts treating a law as neutral
unless and until a litigant proves that the legislature acted with an improper
motive—an exceedingly difficult standard for plaintiffs to satisfy.
Together, these three developments in neutrality analysis have at times
transformed the First Amendment from a meaningful command about the
effects of a law—“make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”13—to
a shallow and easily evaded inquiry into whether the government can name
just one neutral purpose served by the law.
We say “at times” because, while this transformation is real and, in our
view, quite dangerous, it is not yet complete or universal. There are still
examples of cases, both at the Supreme Court and in the lower courts, that
do not make this error. This is welcome news for the health of the First
Amendment, because it means there is still room for courts to correct the
problem. Doing so, however, requires understanding how the neutrality
analysis was traditionally employed, how the secondary effects doctrine has
gradually warped that analysis over time, and how existing precedents and
current cases offer the Supreme Court a path back to the original test.
Parts I and II of this Article set forth our doctrinal argument about the
influence of the secondary effects doctrine. Part I briefly describes the
content-neutrality inquiry that lies at the heart of First Amendment analysis
and how the Court has traditionally applied this standard to require
neutrality in three respects: the law’s application, the asserted government
justification, and the governmental motive. Part II explores how the three
doctrinal changes set out above have quietly distorted the standard contentneutrality doctrine over the past three decades, frequently turning it into a
much weaker and less speech-protective inquiry than is generally
understood.
Part III looks at some post-Renton decisions both at the Supreme Court
and in the federal courts of appeals to demonstrate how this doctrinal shift
has caused precisely the changes to First Amendment law feared by
Renton’s early critics, even where courts do not expressly embrace or apply
the secondary effects doctrine. Indeed, in several recent cases, different
federal courts of appeals have relied on these doctrinal shifts to declare even
openly viewpoint-discriminatory laws—laws the courts themselves
recognized as designed to “singl[e] out . . . favored messages”14 in public
forum speech regulation—to be “content neutral.”

12. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“The principal
inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”); see also Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 711 (2000) (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. See, e.g., Int’l Women’s Day March Planning Comm. v. City of San Antonio, 619
F.3d 346, 361 (5th Cir. 2010); see also infra Part III.B.4.
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Finally, Part IV discusses some suggested ways in which both the
Supreme Court and the lower courts can act to restore the content-neutrality
test to its intended strength, and therefore to its role as “the keystone of
First Amendment law.”15
I. THE TRADITIONAL CONTENT-NEUTRALITY ANALYSIS:
THREE TYPES OF NONNEUTRALITY
The content-neutrality inquiry has been deemed “[p]erhaps the most
intriguing feature . . . [and] the most pervasively employed doctrine in the
jurisprudence of free expression.”16 The Court has repeatedly indicated that
the content inquiry is designed to prohibit government efforts to
discriminate among ideas.17 Ultimately, the content inquiry helps identify
those laws that are most likely to arise from discriminatory motives and are
most susceptible to abuse.18 As Justice Elena Kagan has explained, the
goal of the content distinction is “to identify a set of improper motives,
which themselves may give rise to untoward consequences.”19
The differences in treatment of content-based and content-neutral
restrictions make the content distinction almost dispositive on the issue of a
statute’s constitutionality.20 In order to protect against government
discrimination among different messages,21 courts apply strict scrutiny to
content-based laws,22 under which the legislature must be found to have
15. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443 (1996).
16. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 189 (1983); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 110 (1980);
Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV.
113, 113 (1981). Professor Redish has argued that the distinction “is both theoretically
questionable and difficult to apply,” and has suggested that we do away with it. Redish,
supra, at 114.
17. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (“The rationale of the
general prohibition, after all, is that content discrimination ‘raises the specter that the
Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’”
(quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 116 (1991))).
18. See Kagan, supra note 15, at 451–52.
19. Id. at 451.
20. See Stone, supra note 16, at 196 (noting that the scrutiny used for content-based
regulations “approaches absolute protection”).
21. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (“[T]he First Amendment reflects
a ‘profound national commitment’ to the principle that ‘debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’ and [the Supreme Court] ha[s] consistently commented
on the central importance of protecting speech on public issues.” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 66 (1983) (“[V]iewpoint discrimination implicates core First Amendment
values . . . .”).
22. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 660 (1994) (noting that,
even absent evidence of illicit motive, strict scrutiny is also employed when the government
regulates in a manner that “raise[s] suspicions that their objective [is], in fact, the
suppression of certain ideas”); Perry, 460 U.S. at 66 (agreeing that “no case has applied any
but the most exacting scrutiny to a content or speaker restriction that . . . tended to favor the
advocacy of one point of view on a given issue” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1296 (7th Cir. 1981))).
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crafted a narrowly tailored restriction that is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest.23 Many commentators have noted—and the
Court’s opinions demonstrate—that this test is nearly impossible to
satisfy.24
Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, generally receive more
deferential treatment.25 Not only is the government interest held to a lower
standard—the interest need be merely “significant” or “substantial” rather
than “compelling”26—but the Court has also explicitly rejected a strict
“least restrictive means” test, requiring instead that the means be narrowly
tailored and leave ample alternative outlets.27 In addition to receiving this
more relaxed standard of review, content-neutral laws may be treated as
“time, place, and manner” restrictions,28 and may even impose differential
burdens on speakers so long as they are “incidental.”29
23. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 660–61. There is also a strain within the First Amendment
cases that suggests that a content-based law should be considered per se unconstitutional, at
least in certain circumstances. For example, the Court has declared, “The government must
abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (emphasis added). This language
suggests that, in some circumstances, the targeting of particular content might not even be
eligible for the compelling interest test. This view of content-based laws was also endorsed
by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime
Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 124–25 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
24. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (noting that
strict scrutiny “is a demanding standard. ‘It is rare that a regulation restricting speech
because of its content will ever be permissible.’” (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t
Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000))); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997)
(noting that strict scrutiny is “the most demanding test known to constitutional law”).
25. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 312–13 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has dramatically lowered its scrutiny . . . once it has
determined that such regulations are content-neutral[,] . . . [applying] only a minimal level of
scrutiny.”); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 615, 654 (1991) (noting that content neutral regulations receive more lenient
treatment because they “do not pose the type of threat with which the Court is primarily
concerned”).
26. See Williams, supra note 25, at 640 (“A significant state interest represents a type of
lowest common denominator . . . .”); see also Redish, supra note 16, at 127 (“[I]t is
practically inconceivable that an asserted governmental purpose will not qualify.”).
Although the content-neutrality tests discussed herein have developed in varied
circumstances, most notably in symbolic speech and time, place, and manner restrictions,
these tests have essentially merged. See Williams, supra note 25, at 650–54 (noting that
there is “little, if any” difference between the tests (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 298)).
27. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797 (1989); see also id. at 803
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s substitution of “mandatory deference” in
place of the previous narrow-tailoring requirement).
28. See Redish, supra note 16, at 114–15 (citing regulations, such as the ordinance at
issue in Mosley, which limited only the time, place, or manner of expression but did so based
on content and thus did not receive deferential review). “Time, place, and manner”
restrictions are allowed because the Court has recognized that
expressive activity, even in a quintessential public forum, may interfere with other
important activities for which the property is used. Accordingly, this Court has
held that the government may regulate the time, place, and manner of the
expressive activity, so long as such restrictions are content neutral, are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample
alternatives for communication.
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In order to understand fully the ways in which the neutrality test has been
warped, it is helpful to think of three aspects of content-neutrality, all of
which were traditionally required before the Court would deem a law
neutral. First, to qualify as neutral, a law must be neutral in its application:
the law must apply equally to speech regardless of its message.30 Second,
the law must also be content neutral in its justification: the government
must prove that the interests asserted to support the law are implicated
regardless of the content of speech.31 This justification analysis asks
whether it is something about the content of the speech itself that raises the
government’s interest or makes the government think the interest needs
protecting in the particular context at issue.32 Third, the legislature must
not have acted with the motive of favoring or disfavoring a particular
viewpoint or content.
A. The Application Inquiry
A court will deem a law content based, and therefore almost certainly
invalid, if its application is determined by the content of expression.33
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley34 provides a classic example. The
City of Chicago had enacted a municipal ordinance banning all picketing
within 150 feet of a school building while school was in session, except
“the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.”35
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (plurality opinion).
29. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see also Redish, supra note 16, at 126–27.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000)
(“Section 505 applies only to channels primarily dedicated to ‘sexually explicit adult
programming or other programming that is indecent.’”); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.
310, 315 (1990) (“The Government contends that the Flag Protection Act is constitutional
because . . . the Act does not target expressive conduct on the basis of the content of its
message.”); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
31. See, e.g., Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315 (“Although the Flag Protection Act contains no
explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear
that the Government’s asserted interest is related ‘to the suppression of free expression,’ and
concerned with the content of such expression.” (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
410 (1989))).
32. See id. at 315–17. Flag-burning cases provide the clearest example of the Supreme
Court using this type of analysis. In both Texas v. Johnson and United States v. Eichman,
the Court evaluated the constitutionality of laws against burning the American flag. The
government each time asserted interests in preserving the flag as a national symbol and
preventing onlookers from being offended or starting a confrontation. Because the Court
ruled that these interests were dependent on the intended message of the flag burning—that
these interests were only harmed by someone who burned the flag to criticize the United
States but not by a Marine who performed the exact same burning but did so to dispose
respectfully of the flag—the laws had content-based justifications. Because the asserted
interests were only threatened by burnings with a certain message, the Court applied strict
scrutiny. See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318. See generally Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412.
33. See, e.g., Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 93. As will be discussed infra, the statute in Mosley technically does not state
an application-based exception. Rather, the statute simply identifies the location of the
protested event—here a labor problem—and the Court treated the law as containing the
additional requirement that the protesting outside the school involved in the labor dispute
had to concern the labor dispute to qualify for the special treatment. Because Mosley
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Striking down the law, the Court noted that, because of the explicit
exception for labor picketing, “the ordinance itself describes impermissible
picketing not in terms of time, place, and manner, but in terms of subject
matter. The regulation ‘thus slip[s] from . . . neutrality . . . into a concern
about content.’”36 Thus, because one must know the content of the speech
in order to determine whether the speech violates the law—i.e., in order to
apply the law—the ordinance is content based.
The flag-burning case of Texas v. Johnson37 provides another example.
There, the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas law prohibiting the
“desecration of venerable objects” using a typical application-based
analysis. The Court struck down the law because it defined the crime as
requiring that the actor know it “will seriously offend” others.38 The law
thus sorted legal from illegal flag burning based on whether it was likely to
offend others. As the Court found, “Whether Johnson’s treatment of the
flag violated Texas law thus depended on the likely communicative impact
of his expressive conduct.”39 The Court found the law to be content based
in its application and thus unconstitutional.40
Thus far, the content inquiry is straightforward. If a law applies only to
speech of a particular content or viewpoint, it will be deemed content based
and will likely be struck down. This makes sense because any law that
applies only to certain content is overwhelmingly likely to arise from an
illegitimate governmental objective, whether it be aiding speakers with a
favored viewpoint or burdening speakers with a disfavored one.
As we shall see, though, few legislatures are foolish (or honest) enough
to admit they are attempting to burden speech of a particular content.
Rather, most legislatures can accomplish the same end by: (a) broadening
the restriction to apply, at least in theory, to a wider range of speech; or
(b) by claiming that the true objective is to address some other problem not
directly tied to speech. Thus, the traditional content-neutrality test
necessarily focused not only on the law’s application, but also on the law’s
justification.
B. The Justification Inquiry
The Court has repeatedly stated that in order to be considered content
neutral, a law must be “justified without reference” to the content of speech.
When properly employed, this “justified without reference” test requires
(1) the government to offer a neutral interest supporting the law, and (2) the
court to test that neutral interest to determine whether it is only threatened
traditionally is treated as the quintessential example of discrimination in application based on
content, we will treat it as such for the time being. But see infra notes 117–20 and
accompanying text.
36. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99 (alteration in original) (quoting Henry Kalven, Jr., The
Concept of Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 29).
37. 491 U.S. at 397.
38. Id. at 400 n.1.
39. Id. at 411.
40. See id. at 420.
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by speech of a particular content. Thus, unlike the application inquiry—
which focuses on how the law actually applies—the justification inquiry
focuses instead on the interests the law serves, and whether it serves those
interests regardless of the content of the speech involved.
Three cases in particular demonstrate how rigorous this justification
inquiry can be: United States v. O’Brien,41 Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence,42 and United States v. Eichman.43
In symbolic speech cases beginning with O’Brien, the Court indicated
that a law prohibiting expressive conduct is only “sufficiently justified . . .
if it furthers . . . a substantial governmental interest [and] if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”44
The statute at issue in O’Brien prohibited destruction of a draft card.45 The
Court began by stating that the law was content neutral in its application; it
did not distinguish among those who burned the draft card for different
messages or between those who destroyed draft cards for no expressive
purpose at all and those who did so for its communicative value.46
But this finding of content-neutral application did not end the First
Amendment inquiry. Instead, the Court went on to examine the statute to
determine whether it was content neutral in its justification as well.47 The
Court began this analysis by focusing on the government interests
supporting the law. The Court found that Congress had a “legitimate and
substantial” interest in preserving draft cards because the cards serve
purposes such as proving that an individual has registered for the draft,
facilitating communication between registrants and local boards, and
demonstrating availability for induction in times of national crisis.48 These
interests, at least in theory,49 were implicated by all destruction of draft
cards, not merely destruction performed in order to express certain views.50
Because the government interest was implicated by any destruction,
41. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
42. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
43. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
44. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
45. See id. at 370.
46. See id. at 375 (“[The statute] prohibits the knowing destruction of certificates issued
by the Selective Service System, and there is nothing necessarily expressive about such
conduct. The [statute] does not distinguish between public and private destruction, and it
does not punish only destruction engaged in for the purpose of expressing views.”).
47. See id. at 377.
48. See id. at 378–79.
49. One might argue, however, that the law really was content based because hardly
anyone ever burned draft cards except for precisely the purpose of communicating
opposition to the draft. In other words, it is very unlikely that the law was motivated by a
wish to punish the “odd soul who burns a draft card just to stay warm or to light up his
campsite.” Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive Public and Private: Some Notes
Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 34.
50. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382 (“When O’Brien deliberately rendered unavailable his
registration certificate, he wilfully frustrated this governmental interest. For th[e]
noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing else, he was convicted. [This
case] is therefore unlike one where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct
arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself
thought to be harmful.”).
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regardless of the presence or content of expression, the Court found the
government interest to be “unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.”51 The law was justified without reference to the content of
speech.
The Court also has used a strong justification inquiry in cases involving
time, place, and manner restrictions. In Clark, for example, a group called
Community for Creative Non-Violence sought to participate in a round-theclock demonstration on the National Mall and in Lafayette Park in
Washington, D.C.52 Pursuant to an Interior Department regulation, the
National Parks Service denied permission for the portion of the
demonstration that called for sleeping overnight in the park.53 In analyzing
the First Amendment challenge, the Court first reiterated the requirement
that a law not only be content neutral in its application, but also must be
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”54
The Court found this justification inquiry satisfied because the
government’s asserted interest was implicated by any overnight sleeping in
the park, not just that with a certain message: “Damage to the parks as well
as their partial inaccessibility to other members of the public can as easily
result from camping by demonstrators as by nondemonstrators.”55 Thus, as
in O’Brien, the Supreme Court’s content inquiry asked not whether the state
had merely asserted an interest that did not mention content, but whether
that interest would be threatened by all the prohibited conduct regardless of
its message, or only by conduct with a particular message. As in O’Brien,
the law at issue was justified without reference to the content of speech.
The best example of the Court rejecting a statute through this
justification-based content analysis occurs in the second of the flag-burning
cases, Eichman. In response to the Court’s decision in Johnson, Congress
enacted its own flag-burning prohibition, this time eliminating the “offense”
requirement, presumably in hopes of being deemed content neutral because
of its new, broader application.56 The Court made clear, however, that a
legislature cannot simply create content neutrality by enacting a broader law
to serve the same content-driven interests. When the new law was
challenged, the Court held that although the law would indeed survive an
application-based analysis, it remained content-based because it failed a
justification-based inquiry: “Although the Flag Protection Act contains no
explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct,”—i.e.,
it was content neutral in application—“it is nevertheless clear that the
Government’s asserted interest is ‘related to the suppression of free
expression,’ . . . and concerned with the content of such expression.”57 In
explaining this finding, the Court indicated that Congress’s asserted
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 377.
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 291–92 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 298.
See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 314 (1990).
Id. at 315 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989)).
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interest—preserving the flag as a national symbol—was implicated only by
certain acts of burning the flag, based on their communicative content.58
Thus, because the government’s interest was threatened only by flag
burning with a particular content, the law’s justification was content based,
and the Court rejected the law as unconstitutional.59 Simply put, the law
was not justified without reference to the content of speech.
Together, O’Brien, Clark, and Eichman demonstrate that the test for
content-neutrality treatment is not limited merely to a law’s application, but
must also include an analysis of whether the government’s asserted
justification depends on content. The government’s asserted interest must
be one that is implicated by the prohibited act without regard to
communicative content.
C. The Motivation Inquiry
Beyond looking at a law’s application and justification, the neutrality test
has also historically considered the government’s purpose or motive, at
least to some extent. The Court’s approach in this area has always been
somewhat confusing. On one hand, the Court famously proclaimed in
O’Brien that “this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”60 Yet the Court
has also declared that “a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain
circumstances to show that a regulation is content-based.”61
Despite these tensions, it is clear that the Court has historically
considered whether a law was enacted for the purpose of restricting speech
with which the government disagrees as part of its neutrality test. For
example, in Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,62 the
Court analyzed an ordinance that prohibited the posting of signs on public
property.63 The Court explained that there could be some asserted
government interests “such as a desire to suppress support for a minority
party or an unpopular cause, or to exclude the expression of certain points
of view from the marketplace of ideas,” that are “so plainly illegitimate that
they would immediately invalidate the rule.”64 Yet the Court found the law
neutral because it saw “not even a hint of bias or censorship in the City’s
enactment or enforcement of this ordinance,” and there was “no claim that
the ordinance was designed to suppress certain ideas that the City finds
distasteful or that it has been applied to appellees because of the views that
they express.”65

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. at 316–17.
See id.
See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
466 U.S. 789 (1984).
Id. at 804.
Id.
Id.
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The Court recently confirmed that it will consider governmental purpose
or motive in its content analysis in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.66 In Sorrell,
the Court considered the constitutionality of a Vermont law regulating the
use and dissemination of pharmacy records that reveal the prescribing
practices of individual doctors. The Court explained, “Just as the
‘inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional,’ a
statute’s stated purposes may also be considered.”67 The Court found that
the legislature had “designed [the statute] to target [certain] speakers and
their messages for disfavored treatment,” and found the law content
based.68
To be sure, this is an inquiry that most laws survive—it is clear that only
the rare legislature would be honest or ill-advised enough to expressly
design a law for improper purposes. Yet it is equally clear that, should such
a motive be actually discovered, the Court will deem a law to be
unconstitutional.
Justice Kagan has suggested that the content-neutrality analysis itself
appears to be designed to ferret out improper government motives.69 As
she put it, the application of First Amendment law is best understood and
explained “as a kind of motive-hunting,”70 with courts looking to invalidate
laws based on an impermissible legislative motive, namely government
disagreement with certain messages.71 Yet, because direct inquiries into
motive would be easy for governments to avoid, Justice Kagan argues that
the content-neutrality test functions as a “tool[] to flush out illicit motives
and to invalidate actions infected with them.”72 In this way, the contentneutrality inquiry “serves as the keystone to First Amendment law.”73
We agree with Justice Kagan’s assessment of First Amendment doctrine
in general, the neutrality test in particular, and the dangers of building the
66. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663–64 (2011).
67. Id. at 2663 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968)).
68. Id. at 2663–64 (“Given the legislature’s expressed statement of purpose, it is
apparent that [the law] imposes burdens that are based on the content of speech and that are
aimed at a particular viewpoint.”); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392
(1992) (“The point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in
some fashion other than silencing speech.”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”).
69. See Kagan, supra note 15, at 414.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. Kagan further explains:
Let us accept that the First Amendment prohibits restrictions on speech
stemming, even in part, from hostility, sympathy, or self-interest. And let us
accept that the difficulty of proving this impermissible motive—resulting, most
notably, from the government’s ability to invoke pretextual reasons—gives rise to
a set of rules able to flush out bad motives without directly asking about them.
What would these rules look like?
The first rule would draw a sharp divide between content-based and contentneutral restrictions.
Id. at 443.
73. Id.
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doctrine around direct inquiries that governments can easily manipulate to
restrict speech. As set forth in the next section, however, we believe that
the neutrality test has become—in a way that could not have been apparent
at the time of Justice Kagan’s article—a much more direct inquiry into
motive, and thus precisely the sort of easily avoidable and manipulable test
Justice Kagan criticized.
II. HOW THE SECONDARY EFFECTS DOCTRINE HAS WARPED THE
NEUTRALITY INQUIRY
When courts employ all three aspects of the traditional neutrality
analysis—the application test, the “justified without reference” analysis,
and a motivation inquiry—the content-neutrality test can act as a relatively
effective mechanism for screening out improper speech restrictions. As set
forth in this section, however, the secondary effects doctrine undermines
this traditional inquiry in three important ways.
First, the express use of the secondary effects doctrine directly
undermines the most straightforward requirement of content neutrality: that
a law must be neutral in its application. As Renton’s critics have noted, the
secondary effects doctrine itself permits governments to regulate speech
based on its content—that is, to enact laws that are content based in their
application—so long as it is asserting a neutral reason for the regulation.
Second, because of reliance on Renton, courts (including the Supreme
Court) have begun using a much weaker version of the “justified without
reference” analysis, even in non-secondary-effects cases concerning core
political speech. In particular, the post-Renton approach to this justification
analysis does not seem to require the same type of means-ends analysis
undertaken in O’Brien, Clark, and Eichman.
Third, again in reliance on Renton, courts have begun claiming that the
“principal inquiry” for content analysis is whether the government operated
with an impermissible motive (i.e., “because of disagreement with the
message it conveys”).74 This formulation of the neutrality analysis
improperly elevates motive—which is easy for governments to fake and
hard for courts to assess—over the more objective application and
justification inquiries.
Our hypothesis here is that these three developments—and particularly
the last two—have subtly distorted the content-neutrality analysis even
applied to regulations of political speech by turning it into a direct inquiry
focused almost exclusively on legislative motive. As we see it, this
weakens the neutrality inquiry and is a departure from the traditional
content analysis in precisely the same way many commentators feared the
secondary effects doctrine would eviscerate the First Amendment. But
because these changes have occurred gradually over time—and because the
secondary effects doctrine is almost never mentioned in these cases—these
developments have not prompted anything like the outcry from First
Amendment scholars that originally greeted Renton.
74. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
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A. Express Use of the Secondary Effects Doctrine Undermines the
Content-Neutrality Test
The development of the secondary effects doctrine undermines the
neutrality test because it permits laws that are clearly content based to be
treated as content neutral in certain circumstances.
1. Origins of the Doctrine: Young, Renton, and City of Erie
Historically, the secondary effects doctrine can be traced to Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc.,75 where the Court considered a city
ordinance that regulated the placement of adult theaters in relation to other
adult businesses and residential areas.76 Although acknowledging that the
law was content based, the Court ultimately held that the law was justified
by “the city’s interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods.”77
In a footnote, the Court used, for the first time, the “secondary effects”
language:
The Common Council’s determination was that a concentration of
“adult” movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus
of crime, effects which are not attributable to theaters showing other types
of films. It is this secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt
to avoid, not the dissemination of “offensive” speech.78

The Court explained that its footnoted reference to “secondary effects” was
not its sole reason for upholding the law. The ruling was also supported by
what the Court saw as the lower value of “adult” speech as compared with
“untrammeled political debate” or “political oratory or philosophical
discussion.”79
A decade later, the Court followed Young with its decision in Renton.80
Renton involved a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult theaters from
being located within a thousand feet of any residential zone, park, church,
or school.81 The Court first observed that the ordinance did not “fit neatly
into either the ‘content-based’ or the ‘content-neutral’ category,”82 as the
ordinance was addressed specifically at adult theaters yet restricted only
their location. The Court deemed the ordinance content neutral, however,
noting that the law “is aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult
motion picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters
75. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
76. Id. at 52–53.
77. Id. at 71.
78. Id. at 71 n.34.
79. Id. at 70 (“[I]t is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression
is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political
debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal comment.
Whether political oratory or
philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild
can understand why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us
would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see
‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our choice.”).
80. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
81. Id. at 43.
82. Id. at 47.
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on the surrounding community.”83 The Court therefore believed that the
City’s “predominant” intent was “unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.”84 The city had acted validly in attempting to “prevent crime,
protect the city’s retail trade, [and] maintain property values, . . . not to
suppress the expression of unpopular views.”85
The Renton Court made certain, however, to also cite Young’s statement
distinguishing the level of First Amendment protection for such speech as
compared to political speech: “[I]t is manifest that society’s interest in
protecting [sexually explicit] expression is of a wholly different, and lesser,
magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate . . . .”86 And in
dissent, Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall attempted to
reinforce this point by arguing that “the Court’s analysis is limited to cases
involving ‘businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials,’ and thus does
not affect our holdings in cases involving state regulation of other kinds of
speech.”87
The Court applied the secondary effects doctrine again in City of Erie v.
Pap’s A.M.88 In Erie, the Court relied on the secondary effects doctrine to
hold that a ban on public nudity was content neutral. Although there was
some evidence that the law was aimed at banning nude dancing—including
“statements by the city attorney that the public nudity ban was not intended
to apply to ‘legitimate’ theater productions”—the Court found the law
neutral because “one purpose” of the ordinance was “to combat harmful
secondary effects.”89
Together, Young, Renton, and Erie establish that—at least in the context
of pornography and adult businesses—a law that would otherwise fail the
traditional content-neutrality analysis may still be analyzed as content
neutral. This is apparently true even: (1) when the law’s application turns
entirely on the content of speech (for example, the zoning restrictions in
Renton were triggered solely by the content of movies shown); (2) when the
law’s justification depends on content (for example, the zoning restrictions
in Renton were justified only because of a perceived connection between
the content of films shown and likely crime and other effects in the
community); and (3) even where there is evidence of a content-based
motivation (for example, in Erie, where the Court was willing to ignore
openly stated government content preferences so long as “one purpose” of
the law was to target secondary effects). In this regard, the secondary
effects test therefore undermines each of the three parts of the traditional
neutrality inquiry described in Part I.B, supra.

83. Id.
84. Id. at 48.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 49 n.2 (first alteration in original) (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)).
87. Id. at 55–56 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
88. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
89. Id. at 292.
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2. Secondary Effects and Government Motive
At heart, secondary effects doctrine is really a claim about the importance
of governmental motive. The doctrine essentially provides that a
government regulation of speech can be permissible if the government’s
motive—that is, its reason for enacting a particular law—is something other
than a concern about the communicative impact of the speech. If the laws
in either Renton or Young were enacted simply because the legislatures
disliked the content of the films at issue, both would have been
unconstitutionally content based. But because the legislature asserted a
different motive—namely to address the “secondary” effects of adult movie
theaters, such as the crime that often accompanies such theaters—the laws
were not subjected to strict scrutiny and were upheld.
The ease with which the secondary effects doctrine permits a
governmental claim of permissible motive to insulate a law from strict
scrutiny prompted many commentators to sound the First Amendment
alarm. As discussed above, Justice Brennan explained the dangers of
permitting a government’s claimed motive to govern the level of scrutiny a
speech restriction receives:
The dangers and difficulties posed by the Renton analysis are
extensive. Although in this case it is easy enough to determine that the
display clause does not aim at a “secondary effect” of speech, future
litigants are unlikely to be so bold or so forthright as to defend a
restriction on speech with the argument that the restriction aims to protect
listeners from the indignity of hearing speech that criticizes them. Rather,
they are likely to defend content-based restrictions by pointing, as Justice
O’Connor suggests, to secondary effects like “congestion, . . . visual
clutter, or . . . security . . .” But such secondary effects offer countless
excuses for content-based suppression of political speech.90

Many commentators have raised similar concerns, calling the secondary
effects doctrine “an impressively bold act of illogic”91 that has “been much
discredited,”92 and “if taken seriously and applied broadly, would
effectively negate all First Amendment protection for all disfavored
advocacy.”93 As David Hudson observes, “The problem with this
90. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
91. Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1120 (2005) (“It would seem hard to imagine a law that was more
obviously a regulation of speech based on its content. Yet the Court, in an impressively bold
act of illogic, deemed the ordinance content-neutral. . . . Thus the justification for the law,
not the face of the law, became dispositive of its First Amendment validity.”).
92. Stephen Townley, Note, The Hydraulics of Fighting Terrorism, 29 HAMLINE L. REV.
65, 79 n.93 (2006) (“The secondary effects doctrine has, however, been much discredited.”).
93. Thomas R. McCoy, Understanding McConnell v. FEC and Its Implications for the
Constitutional Protection of Corporate Speech, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1043, 1048 n.31 (2005)
(“It is difficult to perceive any limit on the applicability of this secondary effects doctrine
since the government’s ultimate regulatory objective in every case of suppressing core
political speech is the prevention of some undesirable effect of the message. Direct
suppression of the speech in and of itself is never the ultimate regulatory objective. The
ultimate regulatory objective is always the prevention of some effect that is expected to
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expansive doctrine is that all speech causes effects. The secondary effects
doctrine, a fertile ground for abuse, insidiously eviscerates free expression
by allowing government officials to characterize content-based regulations
as content-neutral. In practice, government officials use the doctrine to
silence expression they dislike.”94
3. Secondary Effects Beyond Adult Businesses
Despite these strong criticisms of the secondary effects doctrine, many
commentators appear to take solace in the belief that the doctrine is
generally confined to the context of adult businesses and pornography. For
example, John Fee explains in his recent article about the doctrine:
The good news . . . is that courts generally do not apply the secondary
effects doctrine to most forms of protected speech. The doctrine was
created for the regulation of pornography and sexually oriented

result from the message if left unrestricted. Thus, it appears that the secondary effects
doctrine, if taken seriously and applied broadly, would effectively negate all First
Amendment protection for all disfavored advocacy.”); see also Heidi Kitrosser, From
Marshall McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows: Communicative Manner and the First
Amendment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1339, 1397–98 (2002) (“The secondary effects doctrine, or
any deviation from treatment of facially content-based restrictions as content-based, is
problematic insofar as it fails to comport with free speech theory and insofar as it accords
unrealistic significance to government statements that a regulation has a neutral purpose. As
suggested above, those regulations that target content directly, either on their faces or in
terms of their underlying governmental purposes, should raise presumptions of illegitimacy,
justifying the application of strict scrutiny. From this perspective, there is little basis to
distinguish those regulations that target content directly and that the government justifies on
a noncontent basis, from those regulations that target content directly, but that are
unaccompanied by non-content-based justifications.”); Robert Post, Recuperating First
Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1267 (1995) (“[T]he Court has so far failed to
articulate any substantive First Amendment theory to guide its distinction between primary
and secondary effects.”).
94. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: “The Evisceration of First
Amendment Freedoms,” 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 61 (1997); see also Neuman, supra note 4, at
293 n.145 (“[I]f taken seriously as a statement of first amendment law, [Renton] would
effectively eviscerate the concepts of ‘time, place and manner,’ ‘content neutrality,’ and
‘narrow tailoring.’ It is reasonable to hope that the distortions introduced in that opinion will
apply only to the category of ‘sexually explicit materials . . . .’”); Oser, supra note 4, at 350–
51 (“The shift to motivation and the reduced access requirement have alarmed commentators
who fear that Renton marks a gutting of the first amendment. They read Renton to say that
any ordinance aimed at secondary effects, and not at the suppression of ideas, is
constitutional if it meets a deferential balancing test.”); Philip J. Prygoski, The Supreme
Court’s “Secondary Effects” Analysis in Free Speech Cases, 6 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 29
(1989) (“The secondary effects analysis creates a grave danger of courts upholding laws that
purport to regulate non-speech evils, but are actually designed to restrict the underlying
speech activity.”); William M. Sunkel, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.: CourtApproved Censorship Through Zoning, 7 PACE L. REV. 251, 253 (1986) (“The danger of the
Renton decision is that it heralds a movement away from imposing any meaningful standard
of judicial scrutiny on legislation which intrudes on fundamental first amendment freedoms.
Instead, the Court seems to be headed towards a deferential, ‘rubber stamp’ approach to this
kind of legislation. In Renton, the Court effectively abandoned previously-delineated tests
for determining the validity of a constitutionally-challenged ordinance. Such an approach
constitutes little more than tacit Court approval of governmental censorship through
manipulation of a municipality’s zoning power.”).
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entertainment, a type of expression that differs from other speech in
significant ways.
....
Indeed, recognizing the distinctive constitutional status of
pornographic speech has the advantage of preventing the secondary
effects doctrine from spilling into other areas of law, which could erode
First Amendment protections for all forms of speech.95

Other commentators are in agreement.96
These commentators are generally correct, though the exceptions are
important and worthy of discussion. To be sure, in the years since Renton,
no majority of the Court has ever explicitly applied the secondary effects
approach to political speech. In two cases, however, the Court appeared to
at least consider using the doctrine outside the pornography context. In
Boos v. Barry,97 the Court considered a District of Columbia law that
prohibited displaying signs within 500 feet of foreign embassies with a
particular content—namely those that tended to bring the foreign
government into “public odium” or “public disrepute.”98 Although the
speech at issue was obviously core political speech, three justices (Sandra
Day O’Connor, John Paul Stevens, and Antonin Scalia) at least considered
applying Renton’s secondary effects doctrine.
They found Renton
inapplicable not because the speech was higher value nonpornography
speech, but because the law targeted the primary effect of speech—that is,
the impact of the speech on its audience—and therefore fell outside of
Renton.
Similarly, a majority of the Court at least entertained the notion of using
secondary effects analysis in the 1993 case of City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc.99 The case concerned a Cincinnati law regulating
the placement of freestanding news racks on public property.100 The Court
rejected the City’s attempt to rely on Renton, explaining that there was no
evidence that news racks dispensing commercial handbills (which were
banned) created different secondary effects than news racks dispensing
newspapers (which were permitted).101 Thus, as in Boos, the Court again
distinguished secondary effects analysis.
Despite the absence of a Supreme Court decision expressly applying the
secondary effects doctrine to nonpornographic speech, some lower courts
have begun using the doctrine more broadly, as a handful of commentators

95. Fee, supra note 7, at 293–94.
96. For example, Kathleen Sullivan likewise explained that the secondary effects
doctrine is used by the Court to “uphold otherwise content-based statutes [concerning
sexually explicit speech] whose political counterparts would readily be struck down.”
Sullivan, supra note 6, at 730.
97. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
98. Id. at 315.
99. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
100. Id. at 412.
101. Id. at 430.
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have pointed out.102 These areas include door-to-door solicitation,103
billboards,104 discrimination,105 and commercial entertainment.106 As these
cases indicate, although the Supreme Court has only applied the secondary
effects doctrine to adult business and pornography cases, lower courts have,
at least on occasion, used the doctrine more broadly.
We suspect that it is the general infrequency of these express uses of the
secondary effects doctrine that has prompted many commentators to believe
Renton has been cabined to sexually explicit speech and did not cause the
severe damage its early critics feared. Nevertheless, we believe that Renton
is actually causing this damage quietly through the subtle changes to the
neutrality inquiry described below.
B. A Changed “Justified Without Reference” Analysis
As described above in Part I.B, the traditional content-neutrality analysis
includes an inquiry into whether a law is “justified without reference to the
content of speech.” Historically, that inquiry required the government to do
something more than merely identify a government interest that was not
related to content, such as “public safety,” or “keeping the parks clean,” or
“improving traffic flow.” Instead, the government was required to
demonstrate that the relationship between its allegedly neutral interest and
the regulation of speech it adopted did not depend on the content of speech.
The Court used this justification analysis in O’Brien, Clark, and Eichman,
forcing the government to convince the Court that its justification was
sound, regardless of the expressive content of the regulated speech. Thus,
in Eichman, the Court rejected the state’s attempted reliance on an interest
in protecting the flag as a national symbol not because it found the interest
invalid (the Court said the opposite), but because the justification for the
law only made sense as to flag burnings with a particular message. The law
was not justified without reference to the content of speech.107
The secondary effects doctrine has worked a subtle and perhaps
unintended change to the traditional “justified without reference” test.108
102. See generally David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Stevens, Justice Souter and the
Secondary Effects Doctrine, 35 UWLA L. REV. 48, 59 (2003); Barry P. McDonald, Speech
and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1372–82 (2006); Christopher J. Andrew, Note, The Secondary
Effects Doctrine: The Historical Development, Current Application, and Potential
Mischaracterization of an Elusive Judicial Precedent, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1213–
14 (2002).
103. See, e.g., City of Watseka v. Ill. Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1554–58 (7th
Cir. 1986).
104. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Comm’r of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 594–95 (6th Cir. 1987).
105. See, e.g., Presbytery of N.J. of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 902 F.
Supp. 492, 521–22 (D.N.J. 1995).
106. See, e.g., Nat’l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 741–42, 749
(1st Cir. 1995).
107. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
108. For interesting discussions of “stealth overruling” (i.e., deliberate overruling of a
prior precedent by the Court without expressly saying so) and “accidental overruling” (i.e.,
overruling past precedents truly by accident), see Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth
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Rather than forcing the government to demonstrate that its regulation of
speech served neutral interests regardless of the content of speech, the test
has begun to resemble very closely the secondary effects analysis of
Renton. Instead of looking to see whether an allegedly neutral justification
for a law is implicated regardless of content (as it would be, for example, by
a requirement for a parade permit before marching down Main Street),
courts have begun to simply ask whether the government was pursuing any
neutral interest at all, without inquiring as to whether that neutral interest is
served only by restricting speech of a particular content.
1. Justification Analysis in Renton Itself
We believe this has occurred through a little-noticed aspect of Renton.
Although the Court in Renton was quite clear that it was going to treat that
expressly content-based law as content neutral because of the legislative
motive of targeting secondary effects—the move that attracted all of the
attention and criticism—the Court also asserted that the law in Renton was
“justified without reference” to the content of regulated speech:
In short, the Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our
definition of “content-neutral” speech regulations as those that “are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” The
ordinance does not contravene the fundamental principle that underlies
our concern about “content-based” speech regulations: that “government
may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views.”109

The cases cited by the Renton Court are consistent with the traditional form
of the “justified without reference” test, which requires the government to
put forward a justification that does not depend on the content of regulated
speech (as described above in Part I.B). Viewed in conjunction with these
cases, there can be no serious contention that the Renton ordinance passed
the test in the same way.
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., for example, was a commercial speech case that simply
recited the test, but noted that there was no serious contention that a
regulation prohibiting price advertising was content neutral.110 As
described above, Clark expressly considered whether the connection
between the banned activity (sleeping in parks) and the harm to be avoided

Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010), and
Suzanna Sherry, The Four Pillars of Constitutional Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 969
(2011).
109. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48–49 (1986) (quoting Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976),
and Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972)) (citing Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984), and Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981)).
110. Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 (“There is no claim, for example, that the prohibition
on prescription drug price advertising is a mere time, place, and manner restriction.”).
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(litter, etc.) was dependent on the communicative nature of the sleeping.
Finding that the government’s interest was implicated as much by
communicative as noncommunicative sleeping, the Court deemed the
interest neutral.111
In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, the Court
implicitly found that the restriction on leafleting at the Minnesota State Fair
was justified without reference to the content of speech.112 The plaintiffs in
the Heffron case sought the right to practice Sankirtan, the practice of
walking around, soliciting donations, and offering literature to passersby.113
Although the Court indicated that such behavior in the public forum would
likely receive different treatment, it noted that the asserted state interest in
maintaining crowd flow in the limited public forum of a state fair was
sufficient to justify the law.114 Notably, the Court explained that the state’s
interest would be implicated as much by speakers with other content,
including “other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial organizations”
as by the plaintiffs.115 Accordingly, the restriction in Heffron was clearly
justified without reference to the content of speech.116
Finally, the Renton Court’s reliance on Mosley further confirms that the
“justified without reference test” was not historically satisfied by mere
assertion of a neutral interest. In Mosley, the government had prohibited
picketing on a “public way” within 150 feet of a school, but had exempted
peaceful labor picketing.117 In an effort to defend the law, the government
111. Clark, 468 U.S. at 299 (“[T]here is a substantial Government interest in conserving
park property, an interest that is plainly served by, and requires for its implementation,
measures such as the proscription of sleeping that are designed to limit the wear and tear on
park properties. That interest is unrelated to suppression of expression.”).
112. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649 (“[The Minnesota law] applies evenhandedly to all who
wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds. No person or organization,
whether commercial or charitable, is permitted to engage in such activities except from a
booth rented for those purposes.”).
113. Id. at 644–46.
114. Id. at 654 (“By focusing on the incidental effect of providing an exemption from
Rule 6.05 to [Heffron], the Minnesota Supreme Court did not take into account the fact that
any such exemption cannot be meaningfully limited to [Heffron], and as applied to similarly
situated groups would prevent the State from furthering its important concern with managing
the flow of the crowd. In our view, the Society may apply its Rule and confine the type of
transactions at issue to designated locations without violating the First Amendment.”).
115. Id. at 653 (“Indeed, the court below agreed that without Rule 6.05 there would be
widespread disorder at the fairgrounds. The court also recognized . . . a much larger threat to
the State’s interest in crowd control if all other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial
organizations could likewise move freely about the fairgrounds distributing and selling
literature and soliciting funds at will.”).
116. Id. at 654.
117. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92–93 (1972). Section 193-1 of the
Chicago Municipal Code read:
A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly: (i) Pickets or
demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school
building while the school is in session and one-half hour before the school is in
session and one-half hour after the school session has been concluded, provided
that this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful picketing of any school involved
in a labor dispute . . . .
CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 193-1(i) (1972).
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had argued that its exception was permissible “because, as a class, nonlabor picketing is more prone to produce violence than labor picketing.”118
The Court rejected this asserted justification, noting that the First
Amendment bars the city from making generalizations based on the content
or subject matter of speech: “Predictions about imminent disruption from
picketing involve judgments appropriately made on an individualized basis,
not by means of broad classifications, especially those based on subject
matter.”119 Thus the city’s proffered justification was expressly, and
impermissibly, based on the content of regulated speech. Accordingly, the
Court noted, “Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based
on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.”120
Juxtaposed with these cases, it is clear that the ordinance in Renton could
not actually pass the “justified without reference” test, at least as that test
had been applied in the earlier cases described above. Indeed, the exact
opposite is true: the only reason it made sense for the government in
Renton to focus its regulation on adult establishments was the government’s
belief that movie theaters with a particular content created negative
secondary effects.121 Thus the city’s justification—that adult businesses
cause certain harmful secondary effects—was actually directly based on
content.122 If those businesses changed their content—if they started
offering knitting clubs and church services instead of nude dancing—then
the City’s secondary effects rationale disappears entirely.
In this regard, Renton should have been the very exemplar of a law that
was not justified without reference to content of speech. The Renton Court
should have simply acknowledged that the secondary effects doctrine was
an exception to this part of the neutrality test as well, to avoid watering
down the test when applied to the rest of free speech doctrine.
Looking back, it is clear that the exact opposite has happened. Rather
than recognizing Renton as an exception to an ordinarily strong “justified
without reference” analysis, the Court instead began treating Renton as a
paradigmatic example of how the justification test should be employed.

118. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100.
119. Id. at 100–01.
120. Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
121. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (“[T]he adult
theater zoning ordinance was aimed at preventing the secondary effects caused by the
presence of even one such theater in a given neighborhood.”); see also Northend Cinema,
Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Wash. 1978) (explaining that the city amended
the zoning code “to preserve the character and quality of residential life in its
neighborhoods” and “to protect neighborhood children from increased safety hazards, and
offensive and dehumanizing influence created by location of adult movie theaters in
residential areas”).
122. See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 50; Northend Cinema, 585 P.2d at 1158
(acknowledging “the different treatment accorded adult movie theaters as distinguished from
other types of movie theaters”).
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2. Renton Becomes the New Exemplar of the Justification Inquiry
Rather than treat the justification analysis in Renton as an outlier, the
Court instead embraced it as the exemplar for this aspect of the neutrality
test. The first time this occurred, in Boos v. Barry,123 the Court cited
Renton as providing “the definition of a content-neutral statute” as one that
is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”124
Four years later in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,125 the Court again relied on
Renton’s definition of neutrality for the “justified without reference”
analysis:
Another valid basis for according differential treatment to even a
content-defined subclass of proscribable speech is that the subclass
happens to be associated with particular “secondary effects” of the
speech, so that the regulation is “justified without reference to the content
of the . . . speech.”126

With this language, the Court in R.A.V. expressly tied Renton’s “justified
without reference” analysis to its secondary effects language. The R.A.V.
Court apparently viewed Renton’s secondary effects arguments as
connected to, and sufficient to satisfy, the “justified without reference”
portion of the content-neutrality test. In this manner, the secondary effects
doctrine—so loudly objected to by so many defenders of the First
Amendment—was essentially read into the standard justification inquiry,
which is part of the standard neutrality analysis.
Following the Supreme Court’s lead, many other courts have cited
Renton for its “justified without reference” test.127 This broader use of
Renton not only as an exemplar of the secondary effects doctrine, but also
as a model for how to perform the “justified without reference” analysis, is
particularly troubling. The justification for the law in Renton expressly
123. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
124. Id. at 320 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 48) (internal quotation mark omitted).
125. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
126. Id. at 389 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 48).
127. A Westlaw search returns more than 100 hits. Search Results, WESTLAW.COM,
http://www.westlaw.com (search “Renton /25 ‘justified without reference’” in the
ALLCASES database) (last accessed Nov. 22, 2013). Many of these cases appear to follow
R.A.V.’s lead in treating Renton’s secondary effects analysis as part and parcel of its
“justified without reference” analysis. See, e.g., McDoogal’s E., Inc. v. Cnty. Comm’rs, 341
F. App’x 918, 924 (4th Cir. 2009) (“By focusing on the harmful secondary effects, the
Enactments are ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” (quoting
Renton, 475 U.S. at 48)); Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 67 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has held that the speech restriction is content-neutral so long as it is ‘justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48));
Buzdum v. Vill. of Germantown, No. 06-C-159, 2007 WL 3012971, at *20 (E.D. Wis. Oct.
12, 2007) (“Content-based time, place or manner regulations are subject only to intermediate
scrutiny if they ‘are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’”
(quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 48)); Stadium Book & Video, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, Nos.
04-20537-CIV-JORDAN, 04-21156-CIV-JORDAN, 04-20553-CIV-JORDAN, 2006 WL
2374740, at *12 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2006) (“A regulation is subject to intermediate scrutiny if
it is ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’ that is, if it is
‘designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of such businesses.’” (quoting Renton,
475 U.S. at 48)).
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depended on content—it was the adult-oriented content of the businesses in
Renton that convinced the city that they would cause negative secondary
effects. Thus, any “justified without reference” analysis that the Renton law
would pass must be very watered down. This analysis must essentially ask
nothing more than what the secondary effects test asks: is the government
targeting speech because of disagreement with its message? If not, this
extremely weakened justification test is satisfied.
In a sense, this is precisely the effect Justice Brennan feared with the
secondary effects doctrine itself, when he observed in Boos:
No doubt a plausible argument could be made that the political
gatherings of some parties are more likely than others to attract large
crowds causing congestion, that picketing for certain causes is more likely
than other picketing to cause visual clutter, or that speakers delivering a
particular message are more likely than others to attract an unruly
audience. Our traditional analysis rejects such a priori categorical
judgments based on the content of speech, [Mosley], requiring
governments to regulate based on actual congestion, visual clutter, or
violence rather than based on predictions that speech with a certain
content will induce those effects. The Renton analysis, however, creates a
possible avenue for governmental censorship whenever censors can
concoct “secondary” rationalizations for regulating the content of political
speech.128

The same can be said for the post-Renton justification test: if all the
government needs is to name some reason other than disagreement with
speech as its justification, surely such reasons will abound.
Thus while it is certainly true that the Supreme Court has never expressly
applied the secondary effects doctrine to sanction restriction of political
speech, it is equally true that the Supreme Court has, through use of Renton,
essentially enshrined the secondary effects analysis into a weakened version
of the “justified without reference” test. This weakened justification
inquiry essentially requires courts only to look at whether the government
has asserted a neutral motive for its actions, without inquiring whether the
proffered justification depends on content.
C. Ward’s “Principal Inquiry” Analysis
A third change in the content-neutrality test stems from the Supreme
Court’s 1989 decision in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.129 As with both the
secondary effects analysis and the Renton-inspired weaker “justified
without reference” analysis, Ward’s change to the neutrality test focuses on
governmental motive, and does so in heavy reliance on Renton.
In Ward, the Court considered the constitutionality of a New York City
law that regulated sound amplification at a Central Park bandshell.130 In

128. Boos, 485 U.S. at 335 (Brennan, J., concurring).
129. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
130. Id. at 784.
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setting forth the test for content neutrality, the Court explained that the
“principal inquiry” of the neutrality test relates to the government’s motive:
The principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality, in speech cases
generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement
with the message it conveys. The government’s purpose is the controlling
consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content
of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on
some speakers or messages but not others. Government regulation of
expressive activity is content-neutral so long as it is “justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.”131

Ward’s “principal inquiry” paragraph makes three subtle but very
important changes to the content-neutrality inquiry. First, Ward’s emphasis
on governmental purpose as “the controlling consideration” and the
“principal inquiry” in the content-neutrality test was actually a new
development in the doctrine. In a sense, this language seems to confuse
ends with means. There has long been agreement that government
discrimination among ideas is the main target of the content-neutrality test.
But until Ward, the Court had never described an inquiry into government
motive as the principal inquiry when doing the analysis.132
The only authority the Court cites for its “principal inquiry” sentence is
Clark. Yet Clark actually did not elevate government purpose above other
aspects of the neutrality test at all. Instead, the cited portion of Clark
simply stated, “The requirement that the regulation be content-neutral is
clearly satisfied. The courts below accepted that view, and it is not disputed
here that the prohibition on camping, and on sleeping specifically, is
content-neutral and is not being applied because of disagreement with the
message presented.”133 Notably, although the passage from Clark clearly
refers to the fact that the law is not being applied “because of disagreement
with the message,” nothing in Clark suggests that this issue is the
“principal” inquiry, or is more important than determining whether the law
is neutral in its application or in its justification.
Second, the elevation of governmental purpose in Ward’s formulation of
the neutrality test may be due, at least in part, to Renton. After citing Clark,
the Ward Court explained that “a regulation that serves purposes unrelated
to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental
effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”134 Notably, the court
cites Renton for this proposition.135

131. Id. at 791–92 (emphasis added) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 295, Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48,
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (quoting Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)),
and Boos, 485 U.S. at 320–21).
132. See generally Kagan, supra note 15.
133. Clark, 468 U.S. at 295.
134. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
135. Id. (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48).
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As with the justification inquiry, this reliance on Renton in a general
statement of the content-neutrality test is another avenue through which the
secondary effects approach may be having a broader impact than is
generally understood.136 In fact, the reference to a law that “serves
purposes unrelated to the content of expression” is essentially the secondary
effects doctrine by another name. A law banning all antiwar protests on the
National Mall, for example, may be motivated by a dislike of antiwar
protests, but it would certainly “serve purposes unrelated to the content of
expression,” such as reducing litter and congestion.137 So too would a ban
on flag burning (which produces smoke and risk of fire);138 a ban on
leafleting about elections (which can lead to litter);139 and a ban on
nonlabor protesting within 150 feet of a school (which could distract the
students).140
In short, it is virtually impossible to think of speech regulations—even
flagrantly content-based speech regulations—that do not “serve purposes
unrelated to the content of expression.” If all of these qualify as “contentneutral” simply because they also serve a purpose unrelated to content, then
the neutrality test has no meaning at all.
Third, Ward’s reference to “incidental” effects is particularly strange.
Ward notes that a law may be content neutral despite the fact that it has “an
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”141 This is
surely true as to some perfectly neutral laws. For example, a law requiring
a permit to march down Main Street has an incidental effect on speakers
who want to march down Main Street,142 but not on speakers who get their

136. One notable exception here is Barry McDonald, who correctly recognized that
Ward’s emphasis on purpose was a way of “importing” Renton that “threw the door wide
open to content-neutral defenses for selective content restrictions.” See McDonald, supra
note 102, at 1376.
137. See generally Clark, 468 U.S. at 288.
138. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding that flag burning was
“expressive conduct” protected under the First Amendment and that “[t]he State’s interest in
preventing breaches of the peace does not support his conviction because Johnson’s conduct
did not threaten to disturb the peace”); id. at 410 (“We are equally persuaded that this
interest is related to expression in the case of Johnson’s burning of the flag. The State,
apparently, is concerned that such conduct will lead people to believe either that the flag
does not stand for nationhood and national unity, but instead reflects other, less positive
concepts, or that the concepts reflected in the flag do not in fact exist, that is, that we do not
enjoy unity as a Nation. These concerns blossom only when a person’s treatment of the flag
communicates some message, and thus are related ‘to the suppression of free expression’
within the meaning of O’Brien.”).
139. See, e.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649–50
(1981).
140. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92–93, 102 (1972).
141. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986)).
142. Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (“[T]he Court has
recognized that government, in order to regulate competing uses of public forums, may
impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold a march, parade, or rally . . . .” (citing
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574–76 (1941))); see, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 149 (1969) (“It shall be unlawful to organize or hold, or to assist
in organizing or holding, or to take part or participate in, any parade or procession or other
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message out by publishing books or buying television ads. In such
circumstances, the unequal impact of a permitting requirement probably
would be “incidental,” that is, not the intended result of the law.
Curiously, the Ward Court does not cite any such neutral law for this
proposition—instead, it cites Renton. In Renton, however, the relocation of
adult businesses surely was not incidental to the regulatory scheme at
issue.143 Rather, the relocation of businesses of that content was the
deliberate mechanism through which the scheme attempted to achieve its
stated purpose. If businesses with adult content did not relocate, the law
would have been a complete failure. Thus, to the extent Renton qualifies as
an “incidental” burden on the deliberately targeted speakers, the Court is
actually redefining “incidental” to include situations where the government
deliberately targets and directly regulates speakers according to the content
of their speech, but purports to do it for a reason other than suppression of
their ideas. In other words, this use of Renton appears to read the secondary
effects doctrine into the analysis of whether a burden is “incidentally”
falling on a particular speaker or speakers based on content.
Together, Ward’s elevation of governmental purpose as “the controlling
consideration,” its characterization of the neutrality inquiry as satisfied so
long as the law serves any “purposes unrelated to the content of speech,”
and its characterization as “incidental” of even deliberate regulations of
certain speech because of its content, suggest a further move toward making
the neutrality test focus on motive.
In this regard, Ward’s principal inquiry paragraph is the culmination of
the Renton-driven doctrinal shifts we have described in this section. The
“principal inquiry” paragraph relies directly on Renton144—the principal
secondary effects case—in a time, place, and manner case. It cites Renton
more broadly for the proposition that so long as a law serves any neutral
purpose it should be deemed neutral.145 The Ward paragraph claims that
the “principal inquiry” in the neutrality test is whether the government acted
with an impermissible motive, and suggests that even deliberate burdens on
particular speakers can be treated as “incidental.”146
As we shall see below, since these changes to the content-neutrality test,
many courts are committing precisely the sort of First Amendment errors
Justice Brennan, Professor Stone, and others greatly feared with the original
public demonstration on the streets or other public ways of the city, unless a permit therefore
has been secured from the commission.”).
143. Renton, 475 U.S. at 57, 59 (Brennan J., dissenting) (“[B]oth the language of the
ordinance and its dubious legislative history belie the Court’s conclusion that ‘the city’s
pursuit of its zoning interests here was unrelated to the suppression of free expression.’ . . .
Prior to the amendment, there was no indication that the ordinance was designed to address
any ‘secondary effects’ a single adult theater might create. In addition to the suspiciously
coincidental timing of the amendment, many of the City Council’s ‘findings’ do not relate to
legitimate land-use concerns. As the Court of Appeals observed, ‘[b]oth the magistrate and
the district court recognized that many of the stated reasons for the ordinance were no more
than expressions of dislike for the subject matter.’” (second alteration in original)).
144. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48).
145. See id.
146. See id.
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adoption of the secondary effects doctrine. But because courts are deciding
these cases without express reference to the secondary effects doctrine and,
instead, are purporting to use the traditional content-neutrality analysis, the
dangers to the First Amendment have gone largely unnoticed.
III. THE WEAKENED CONTENT-NEUTRALITY TEST IN ACTION
For the reasons set forth above, we believe that the secondary effects
doctrine has distorted the standard content-neutrality analysis in many
cases. Our concern is that the subtle changes to the neutrality test have
turned the test into a much more direct inquiry into governmental motive,
which makes it much easier for governments to favor speech they like and
disfavor speech they dislike.
We have identified seven cases to demonstrate the weakened neutrality
test in action, and to explain how that test differs from the traditional
neutrality analysis.
Our search for examples of this doctrinal problem proceeded as follows.
First, because we believe Ward’s “principal inquiry” paragraph epitomizes
the weakened, post-Renton neutrality approach, we searched for all federal
cases using that formulation of the neutrality test. This searched revealed
more than 200 federal cases. From within this 200, we narrowed the search
further to examine (a) every Supreme Court case to use the formulation
(there are three) and (b) every federal court of appeals case decided between
2008 and 2012 to use the formulation (there are twenty-three).
From within these smaller groups, below we present our analysis of
seven cases in which either the Supreme Court or the courts of appeal get
the content-neutrality analysis wrong in the ways we have described above.
In particular, in reliance on the weakened neutrality analysis, these courts
have treated laws as content neutral, even though they obviously fail the
traditional neutrality inquiry described in Part I, by being content based in
application, justification, or motivation.
Notably, none of these cases concerns sexually explicit speech or adult
businesses—the original target of the secondary effects doctrine. Most
actually concern core political speech. Yet these cases exhibit all the
hallmarks of the secondary effects doctrine:
an overemphasis on
government motive, a willingness to allow laws that are content based and
even viewpoint based in application to be treated as content neutral, and a
largely ineffectual “justified without reference” analysis.
A. Weakened Content Neutrality at the Supreme Court:
Turner, Madsen, and Hill
There are three Supreme Court cases since Ward to rely on Ward’s
“principal inquiry” paragraph as an authoritative statement of the contentneutrality test: Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,147 Madsen v.

147. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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Women’s Health Center, Inc.,148 and Hill v. Colorado.149 Each involves
what was a very controversial content-neutrality analysis in an area other
than sexually explicit speech. None mentions or purports to employ the
secondary effects test. Yet each errs in deeming a content-based law to be
content neutral in the exact ways we have described above, and in the exact
ways predicted by Renton’s early critics.
1. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
Five years after Ward, the Court had occasion to consider its contentneutrality tests in the context of requirements that cable providers carry a
certain amount of local broadcast programming. As part of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,150 Congress
imposed a wide range of requirements on the nation’s cable television
industry.151 Turner concerned two such requirements, which were known
as “must carry” provisions. First, section 4 of the Act required cable
companies to carry a specified number of local commercial broadcasting
stations.152 Second, section 5 of the Act required cable companies to carry
a specified number of local “noncommercial educational” channels.153
These portions of the Act grew out of Congress’s concern that the
success of cable companies would eventually crowd local broadcast stations
out of the market entirely.154 In its findings, Congress explained the
importance of the continued vitality of local broadcast stations, without
which many viewers would not be able to receive programming.155
Congress made clear that its interest in these stations was connected to its
desire to “promot[e] a diversity of views,” and that “public television
provides educational and informational programming to the Nation’s
citizens, thereby advancing the Government’s compelling interest in
educating its citizens.”156 Congress further explained, “A primary objective
and benefit of our Nation’s system of regulation of television broadcasting
is the local origination of programming.
There is a substantial
governmental interest in ensuring its continuation.”157 Further, Congress
stated, “Broadcast television stations continue to be an important source of
local news and public affairs programming and other local broadcast
services critical to an informed electorate.”158
The Court began its neutrality analysis by noting, “Deciding whether a
particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a
148. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
149. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
150. Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(6), (8), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461.
151. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 630.
152. See id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B), (h)(1)(A) (1988)).
153. See id. at 631–32 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 535(a)).
154. See id. at 633–34.
155. See id.
156. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 2(a)(6), (8), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461.
157. Id. § 2(a)(10).
158. Id. § 2(a)(11).
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simple task.”159 The Court then noted Ward’s “principal inquiry”
paragraph explaining that the “‘principal inquiry in determining contentneutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys.’”160
The Court found that Congress had acted with a content-neutral purpose—
“to avoid the elimination of broadcast television” because “‘[s]uch
programming is . . . free to those who own television sets and do not require
cable transmission to receive broadcast television signals,’” and because
“‘[t]here is a substantial governmental interest in promoting the continued
availability of such free television programming, especially for viewers
who are unable to afford other means of receiving programming.’”161
Upon a closer analysis, it is clear that the must-carry provisions at issue
in Turner actually failed all three of the traditional, pre-Renton contentneutrality inquiries. First, the law was content based in its application. In
order to determine whether a cable operator is complying, the FCC must
look at and evaluate the content of the cable operator’s offerings to
determine whether it includes a sufficient number of local commercial and
noncommercial stations. If a cable company is not complying, the remedy
is to require a change in the content of the programming—to delete a
certain number of channels the cable company wishes to provide, and to
replace them with the government’s preferred channels.
The law in Turner is also clearly content based in its justification and
motivation. As Congress’s findings make clear, the very point of the law is
to preserve and protect a particular content that Congress finds valuable,
namely local broadcast channels, because Congress viewed them as “‘an
important source of local news [and] public affairs programming and other
local broadcast services critical to an informed electorate.’”162 Further,
Congress felt educational and informational programming advances “the
Government’s compelling interest in educating its citizens,” and
“promot[es] a diversity of views.”163 Thus, the justification for the law—
Congress’s view that preserving local broadcast stations will be
beneficial—depended in large part on the content of their speech, which
Congress valued. Put another way, if the local broadcast channels decided
to air mindless chatter or a plain blank screen, the must-carry rules would
not serve the government’s purpose at all. Accordingly, it cannot fairly be
said that the law is “justified without reference” to the content of speech; to
the contrary, the law was actually and expressly justified by Congress based

159. Turner, 512 U.S. at 642.
160. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
161. Id. at 646 (quoting Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 § 2(a)(12)).
162. Id. at 648 (quoting Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 § 2(a)(11)); see also Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 § 2.
163. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 2(a)(8)(A), 2(a)(6)).
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on the content of speech of the local channels, and that interest is only
served if the local channels have a particular content.164
Under the traditional neutrality inquiry, therefore, the must-carry
provisions of the Act should have been easily recognizable as content based
and subjected to strict scrutiny.165 Nevertheless, by focusing largely on one
particular neutral purpose, the Court in Turner declared them to be content
neutral, and upheld them, exactly as one would expect under the secondary
effects doctrine. The Court did so without mentioning either the secondary
effects doctrine or Renton.
2. Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.
In Madsen, the Court considered the constitutionality of a state court
injunction against protesters outside of a Florida abortion clinic.166 Among
other things, the injunction established a thirty-six-foot buffer zone on the
public sidewalks around the clinic into which the enjoined parties and
anyone “acting in concert or participation with them” could not enter.167
In evaluating whether the injunction was content-neutral or contentbased, the Court began with Ward: “Our principal inquiry in determining
content-neutrality is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech ‘without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’”168 The
Court therefore stated that “the government’s purpose” is “the threshold
consideration.”169 The Court found this purpose analysis to be simple:
Here, the state court imposed restrictions on petitioners incidental to
their antiabortion message because they repeatedly violated the court’s
original order. That petitioners all share the same viewpoint regarding
abortion does not in itself demonstrate that some invidious content- or
viewpoint-based purpose motivated the issuance of the order. It suggests
only that those in the group whose conduct violated the court’s order

164. The four dissenting justices—Sandra Day O’Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Antonin
Scalia, and Clarence Thomas—recognized this point, saying that they “cannot avoid the
conclusion that [Congress’s] preference for broadcasters over cable programmers is justified
with reference to content. The findings, enacted by Congress as § 2 of the Act . . . make this
clear.” Id. Neither the majority nor the dissent, however, drew the connection to Renton as
the reason for the majority’s weak justification analysis.
165. The Court rejected the government’s suggestion that a relaxed First Amendment
standard should be applied because the law involved television stations. The Court
explained that, while the First Amendment allows the government a freer hand in regulating
broadcast airwaves—which are limited and require some level of regulation in order to be
useable—no such relaxed standard is needed in the cable field, because cable technology
essentially allows a limitless number of speakers. See id. at 636–37. However, the Court did
emphasize that it would only permit differential regulation of cable stations because of the
“bottleneck” control that cable providers have since they control an “essential pathway” for
cable speech and can “silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the
switch.” Id. at 656.
166. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
167. See id. at 759–61.
168. Id. at 763 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
169. Id.
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happen to share the same opinion regarding abortions being performed at
the clinic.170

For these reasons, the Court concluded that the injunction was content
neutral.171
The Court’s analysis of the judge’s motivation in entering the
injunction—while characterized as a “threshold” consideration—was
actually the beginning, middle, and end of its content-neutrality analysis.
Having found that the judge was motivated to stop recurrent law breaking,
rather than to penalize abortion opponents because of their message, the
Court considered its content analysis complete.
Had the Court continued—had it analyzed whether the law was content
based in its application and its justification under the standard neutrality
inquiry described in Part I, supra—the Court would have easily concluded
that the injunction was, in fact, content based.
First and foremost, the Court’s motivation inquiry allowed it to ignore
the express evidence in the record showing that the injunction was content
and viewpoint based in its application. In other words, how and whether
the injunction applied to particular individuals turned entirely on the
content and viewpoint of their speech. In particular, the trial court
repeatedly indicated that it would simply treat those who speak against
abortion as necessarily “acting in concert” with the enjoined parties, as
illustrated by the following exchanges:
Mr. Lacy: “I was wondering how we can—why we were arrested and
confined as being in concert with these people that we don’t know, when
other people weren’t, that were in that same buffer zone, and it was kind
of selective as to who was picked and who was arrested and who was
obtained for the same buffer zone in the same public injunction.”
The Court: “Mr. Lacy, I understand that those on the other side of the
issue [abortion-rights supporters] were also in the area. If you are
referring to them, the Injunction did not pertain to those on the other side
of the issue, because the word in concert with means in concert with those
who had taken a certain position in respect to the clinic, adverse to the
clinic. If you are saying that is the selective basis that the pro-choice
were not arrested when pro-life was arrested, that’s the basis of that
selection. . . .”
....
John Doe No. 16: “I also understand that the reason why I was
arrested was because I acted in concert with those who were
demonstrating pro-life. I guess the question that I’m asking is, were the
beliefs in ideologies of the people that were present, were those taken into
consideration when we were arrested? . . . When you issued the
Injunction did you determine that it would only apply to—that it would
apply only to people that were demonstrating that were pro-life?”
The Court: “In effect, yes.”
170. Id. (first emphasis added).
171. Id.

1220

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

....
John Doe No. 31: “How did the police determine that I was acting in
concert with some organization that was named on this injunction? I again
am a person who haven’t [sic] seen this injunction. So how did the police
determine that I was acting in concert?”
The Court: “They observed your activities and determined in their
minds whether or not what you were doing was in concert with the—I
gather the pro-life position of the other, of the named Defendants.”172

These statements confirm that the injunction was, in fact, both content and
viewpoint based in application. Both the court and the police decided who
was subject to the injunction based on the content and viewpoint of their
speech. All speakers who were (a) speaking about a particular content
(abortion) and (b) a particular viewpoint (opposed to abortion) were
automatically deemed to be “acting in concert” with the people who had
previously been found to have violated the law.
In this regard, the injunction should have been immediately recognizable
as content based in its application—indeed, this is the easiest sort of content
problem to spot, and the judge admitted to using content and viewpoint to
determine whether the injunction would apply to new speakers who had
never met the original lawbreakers. Yet the Supreme Court allowed its
emphasis on the “threshold” question of motive to trump this clear content
problem.
Relatedly, the excerpts from the trial court also reveal that the injunction
was not “justified without reference to the content of speech.” If it were,
the court would have applied the injunction against all speakers in the
thirty-six-foot zone, not simply pro-life speakers. But the exact opposite
happened: speakers who supported abortion were given free rein on the
public sidewalk, while those who opposed abortion were subject to the
injunction, even if they had never met or collaborated with the original
lawbreakers. Clearly the court did not think the injunction was justified for
all speech or all speakers; rather, the court determined which speakers the
injunction applied to based, and apparently only based, on the court’s
“reference to the content of speech.”
The Court in Madsen, however, conducted no inquiry into the law’s
application or whether its justification depended on content. Instead, the
Court simply used its “threshold” analysis of the judge’s motive to end the
neutrality inquiry. This is perhaps not surprising given the Court’s postRenton elevation of motive analysis as the “principal inquiry” in content
neutrality. As discussed in Part II.A, supra, this is also precisely how the
secondary effects doctrine itself proceeds. Yet neither the doctrine nor
Renton is mentioned in the opinion.

172. Id. at 795–97 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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3. Hill v. Colorado
In Hill v. Colorado,173 the Court again addressed abortion protests, this
time in the context of a Colorado ordinance regulating speech outside of
medical facilities. The law provided,
No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight feet of
such person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing
a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest,
education, or counseling with such other person in the public way or
sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door
to a health care facility.174

The Supreme Court upheld the statute as content neutral.175 Writing for
the Court, Justice Stevens began with Ward’s language about the inquiry
into motive being the “principal inquiry” for content neutrality.176 Then
Justice Stevens explained that Colorado’s buffer zone statute was content
neutral for “three independent reasons.”177 First, the law was “not a
‘regulation of speech,’” but rather “of the places where some speech may
occur.”178 Second, Justice Stevens stated that the facial applicability to all
speech, as opposed to just antiabortion speech, proved its content
neutrality.179 Finally, he noted that the state’s interest in protecting access
and privacy is unrelated to the content of the demonstrators’ speech,
rendering the law content neutral because it was “justified without reference
to the content of regulated speech.”180 The Court rejected the petitioners’
suggestions that the requirement for law enforcement officers to determine

173. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
174. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1249 n.4 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (citing 6 COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-9-122 (1993)).
175. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 714.
176. Id. at 719.
177. Id.
178. Id. This is a particularly odd statement by the Court. On this analysis, all time,
place, and manner regulations are no longer regulations of speech but simply regulations “of
the places where speech may occur.” Id. Both before and since Hill, however, the Court has
treated time, place, and manner regulations as regulations of speech, and has subjected them
to strict scrutiny (when they are content based) or intermediate scrutiny (when they are not).
See, e.g., Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2011) (approving a
limitation on speech at a particular legislative session as “a reasonable time, place and
manner limitation”); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (applying strict
scrutiny to a regulation limiting places for nonlabor protests).
Indeed, the Court’s argument here contradicts all of its time, place, and manner
jurisprudence, because the time, place, and manner test itself applies only when there has
been some regulation of speech. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (explaining that the “time, place, and manner” test applies to regulations
of expressive activity).
179. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 719.
180. Id. at 720 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). As will
be discussed infra, the Court simply stated the government interests and, without analysis,
proclaimed that those interests are not related to content. Id. at 719. This pronouncement
stands in stark contrast to the detailed analysis that occurred, for example, in Eichman.
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whether speech was “protest, education, or counseling” rendered the law
content based.181
As in Turner and Madsen, the content-neutrality analysis in Hill bears the
imprint of Renton and the secondary effects doctrine. First, the Court began
by emphasizing the government’s purpose as the controlling consideration.
From this point, the Court then ignored the quite express emphasis on
content in the text of the law itself: approaches to engage in certain types of
speech (“protest, education, or counseling”) were banned, while approaches
to speak in other ways (i.e., idle chatter, asking a question, selling a
product, etc.) were left unregulated. Thus it seems very clear that the
application of the law depended on the content of speech.182
Worse, the Court applied a weak version of the justification inquiry,
seemingly only asking whether the state had named a neutral justification
for the law. In particular, the Court stated that government interests in
“access” and “privacy” are “unrelated to the content of the demonstrators’
speech.”183 At one level, of course, this is obviously correct: the
government might seek to protect an interest in access to medical care or an
interest in privacy in ways that have nothing to do with anyone else’s
speech. In such circumstances a law serving those interests may well be
“justified without reference to the content of speech.”
But in Hill, the only law before the Court was a law that purported to
protect access and privacy by outlawing certain approaches near medical
facilities—and only when the approach is made with the intent to speak.
That is, if a person approached an incoming patient silently and without
carrying a leaflet or holding a sign, the approach is perfectly permissible
under the law at issue in Hill. It is only if that approach is combined with
an intent to engage in certain types of speech that the approach becomes
punishable.
Had the Court applied the type of justification test we saw in O’Brien,
Clark, and Eichman, it would have found that the law was not justified
without reference to the content of speech. As discussed in Part I, in
O’Brien, the state interest was in preserving Selective Service records; in
Clark, the interest was in maintaining clean and accessible parks; in

181. See id. Justice Stevens explained that the law often looks at the content of a
communication to determine the speaker’s purpose, and to determine, for example, whether
a communication is a threat, blackmail, an offer to sell securities, or an agreement to fix
prices. See id. at 720–21.
182. The Court’s reasoning here—that sometimes it is permissible to look at the content
of speech to determine if it falls into a category like bribery or copyright violations, which
have always been understood to be “outside” the First Amendment—seems particularly out
of place when discussing what the Court acknowledges as core protected First Amendment
speech. See id. at 715 (noting that the plaintiffs’ “leafleting, sign displays, and oral
communications are protected by the First Amendment”). The Court is, of course, correct
that courts must take the content of speech into account to determine whether the speech at
issue falls outside of the First Amendment’s protection, but it had never before asserted that
this practice allows legislatures to impose content-based regulations of core protected
speech.
183. Id. at 720.

2013]

NEUTRAL NO MORE

1223

Eichman, the interest was in protecting the flag as a national symbol.184
None of these interests facially involves the content of speech. It was only
by questioning how the regulation at issue actually served the asserted
interest that the Court was able to distinguish the content-based justification
in Eichman from the content-neutral justifications in O’Brien and Clark.
The Court in Hill never probed this connection. The justification inquiry
had withered to asking only whether the state purported to have some
neutral motive. This exactly replicates the secondary effects doctrine,
except that in Hill the speech was core political speech in the public forum,
rather than an adult business.
Had the Court seriously probed whether the law was, in fact, justified
without reference to the content of speech, it would have been forced to
conclude that the law fails that test. The Colorado law did not even apply
to all approaches. Rather, it only punished approaching speakers, and only
those speakers who wanted to engage in a particular type of speech (protest,
education, or counseling). Thus the legislature apparently did not believe
that all approaches, or even all speaking approaches, triggered its interests
in preserving access and privacy. The only logical reason to believe that
some speaking approaches will threaten access or impinge on privacy is if
the legislature (and later the Court) is implicitly assuming the content of the
speech to be something unwelcome. Approaching to say, “Good luck on
your surgery today,” or, “Would you like to buy some Girl Scout cookies?”
or, “The hospital down the street has better doctors,” would neither threaten
access nor privacy.
In this manner, there can be no serious doubt that the law in Hill was not
“justified without reference to the content of speech.” Instead, the law only
made sense as applied to speakers who oppose a medical procedure
(chiefly, abortion). Following the traditional content analysis, the Court
should therefore have deemed the law content-based and applied strict
scrutiny.185
184. See supra Part I.B.
185. The Court’s content analysis in Hill has garnered widespread criticism. Justice
Kennedy wrote that the opinion contradicted “more than a half century of well-established
First Amendment principles.” Hill, 530 U.S. at 765 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1298 (2007) (citing
Hill for the proposition that “Court majorities have unconvincingly denied that the predicate
conditions for strict scrutiny actually exist—for example, by maintaining that a contentbased restriction on speech is not really content-based”); John Fee, Speech Discrimination,
85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1127 (2005) (pointing out that, in applying the Hill analysis, “one
must necessarily examine the content of a person’s speech to determine if it constitutes
‘education, protest or counseling’” (quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 707)); Michael W. McConnell,
Professor, Univ. of Utah Coll. of Law, Remarks at the Symposium Conducted in Honor of
the Inauguration of Andrew K. Benton As the Seventh President of Pepperdine University
(Sept. 23, 2000), in 28 PEPP. L. REV. 747, 748 (2001) (“You cannot tell, other than by the
content of what I say, whether the law [in Hill] is being violated or not. Now if that is not
content-based, I just do not know what ‘content-based’ could possibly mean.”); Sullivan,
supra note 6, at 737 (“Hill showed a striking readiness to accept the Colorado legislature’s
effort to draw a facially neutral statute to achieve goals clearly targeting particular
content.”); cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Professor, Univ. of S. Cal., Remarks at the Symposium
Conducted in Honor of the Inauguration of Andrew K. Benton As the Seventh President of
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4. Counterexample: Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.
To be clear, the Supreme Court does not always employ the type of
weakened content-neutrality analysis we have described above. In fact, in
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,186 the Court recently demonstrated that it
remains quite capable of applying the standard neutrality analysis discussed
in Part I, supra.
Sorrell concerned a Vermont law that limited the dissemination of
pharmacy records about the prescribing practices of different doctors.187
The state asserted what appeared to be neutral interests—protecting patient
privacy, protecting doctors from harassment by sales representatives,
lowering the cost of medical services, and promoting the public health.188
Rather than simply accept these facially neutral interests and deem the
law content neutral—as courts applying the weakened neutrality test we
have described above might do—the Court instead applied the traditional
content-neutrality inquiry to deem the law content based. In particular, the
Court found that because the Vermont law allows use of the information for
“educational communications” but not for marketing purposes, the statute
“thus disfavors marketing, that is, speech with a particular content.”189
Notably, this is the exact opposite of the approach the Court took in Hill,
which saw no content-based restrictions imposing special burdens on
“protest, education, or counseling” that were not imposed on other speech.
Even though the Court acknowledged that many of Vermont’s goals were
permissible, it unequivocally held that those goals could not be advanced by
selectively regulating speech based on its content or the identity of the
speaker. Thus, the Court in Sorrell completely avoided the doctrinal errors
set forth in Part II above.
As we will discuss in Part IV below, the fact that there are still Supreme
Court decisions applying this more traditional content-neutrality inquiry is
heartening, and provides lower courts with an avenue for avoiding the
doctrinal problems set forth above.
However, as we demonstrate in the next section, the existence of the
doctrinal problems described in Part II, and demonstrated in Turner,
Madsen, and Hill is currently leading many courts of appeals to endorse
content- and viewpoint-based laws as neutral.

Pepperdine University (Sept. 23, 2000), in 28 PEPP. L. REV. 752, 752–53 (2001) (agreeing
with the result in Hill but disagreeing with the Court’s rationale: “Where I become
concerned is where the Court tried to find a content-neutral regulation, and the problem is
the whole doctrine of content neutrality right now is quite confused. . . . [And] this case
further adds to the confusion”).
186. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
187. Id. at 2659.
188. See id. at 2668, 2670.
189. Id. at 2663.
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B. Weakened Content Neutrality in the Courts of Appeals
A review of recent cases from the federal courts of appeals suggests that
the Renton-inspired neutrality inquiry is being used to allow governments to
pick and choose which private messages will get favored or disfavored
treatment from the government in the public forum. This is precisely the
danger Renton’s early critics predicted, and it is occurring frequently in the
courts of appeals, without mention of the secondary effects doctrine.
In order to demonstrate further the extent of the current problems caused
by this weakened content-neutrality analysis, we have selected four recent
cases decided by the federal courts of appeals for analysis below. These
cases show the use of this weaker neutrality analysis to uphold laws that
should have been easily classified as content based and sometimes
viewpoint based in the contexts of school dress codes, abortion clinic buffer
zones, satellite television regulation, and parade permitting schemes.
As with the Supreme Court cases discussed above, none of these cases
concerns sexually explicit speech, and none expressly applies Renton or the
secondary effects doctrine. Yet each, in effect, applies the weakened
neutrality analysis we have described to content-based restrictions on core
protected First Amendment activity.
1. School Dress Codes
In Palmer ex rel. Palmer v. Waxahachie Independent School District,190
the Fifth Circuit considered the constitutionality of a public school dress
code. The dress code at issue in Palmer generally prohibited students from
wearing shirts with messages. However, the school district created
exceptions for shirts with “small logos” and, most importantly, for
“principal-approved” shirts that promoted school clubs, organizations,
athletic teams, or school spirit.191
Although it is clear that the First Amendment does not always apply with
its usual rigor in the public school context,192 the court purported to apply
the same content-neutrality inquiry applicable elsewhere under the First
Amendment.193 In applying the neutrality test, the court did acknowledge
the “general rule” that laws that “‘distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content
based.’”194 However, the court relied on the Renton-inspired “principal
190. 579 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2009).
191. See id. at 505 n.1.
192. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
193. See Palmer, 579 F.3d at 506 (“The ‘loss of First Amendment freedoms for even
minimal periods of time constitutes irreparable injury justifying the grant of a preliminary
injunction.’ Because ‘[w]ords printed on clothing qualify as pure speech and are protected
under the First Amendment,’ the dress code’s ban on his shirts would cause Palmer
irreparable injury.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield
Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981), and Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch.
Bd., 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001)).
194. Id. at 509 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1994)).
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inquiry” test—in fact, citing Ward, Turner, and Hill together195—to find
that the dress code was nevertheless content neutral because it was not
designed to suppress unpopular speech. The court explained:
The District was in no way attempting to suppress any student’s
expression through its dress code—a critical fact based on earlier student
speech cases—so the dress code is content-neutral. Its allowance for
school logos and school-sponsored shirts does not suppress unpopular
viewpoints but provides students with more clothing options than they
would have had under a complete ban on messages.196

Under the traditional neutrality test, it should have been clear that a law
that allows the government to choose certain pre-approved messages that
will be permitted—and to ban all other messages—is content based.197 Yet
the court—without citing Renton and without mentioning the secondary
effects doctrine—simply declared the law to be content neutral because of a
nondiscriminatory purpose.198
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result, with similar reasoning, in
Jacobs v. Clark County School District.199 Relying on the “principal
inquiry” language from Ward, the court found a dress code that
discriminated between permissible and impermissible messages to be
content neutral.200 The court emphasized that the school district’s policy
had a neutral motive because it
[wa]s aimed at “increasing student achievement, promoting safety, and
enhancing a positive school environment.” Nothing in the Regulation’s
language suggests it was directed at the type of messages or specific
viewpoints previously conveyed by students’ wardrobe choices; indeed,
the record evidence unambiguously indicates that the District’s purpose in
enacting the Regulation was to further the Regulation’s stated goals, not
to suppress the expression of particular ideas.201

As in the Fifth Circuit, therefore, the Ninth Circuit allowed the presence
of such neutral motives to permit a law that was expressly based on content
(pro-school logos were permitted, but all other messages were prohibited)
to be treated as content neutral.202
This move by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits—allowing the asserted
existence of a content-neutral motive to overcome the express contentbased application of a law—is precisely how the secondary effects doctrine

195. See id. at 510 n.12 (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000)).
196. Id. at 510.
197. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 66 (1983)
(noting that “viewpoint discrimination implicates core First Amendment values” and is thus
content based); see also supra Part I.
198. See Palmer, 579 F.3d at 510 (“The District was in no way attempting to suppress
any student’s expression through its dress code—a critical fact based on earlier student
speech cases—so the dress code is content-neutral.”).
199. 526 F.3d 419, 432–33 (9th Cir. 2008).
200. Id. at 432 & n.30.
201. Id. at 432.
202. Id. at 433.
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works.203 Thus, these courts are basically applying the secondary effects
doctrine as part of their standard neutrality analysis.204
2. Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones
In McCullen v. Coakley,205 the First Circuit upheld a Massachusetts
abortion clinic buffer zone law. The statute at issue created zones on public
streets and sidewalks extending thirty-five feet in all directions from all
entrances, exits, and driveways of stand-alone abortion clinics. Although
passersby were permitted to cross through the zones, most speakers were
not permitted to enter the zone to engage in speech or advocacy. The law
made an exception for employees and agents of the abortion clinics, who
were exempt from the law, and therefore permitted to operate within the
zones.206
The district court had upheld the law as content neutral “relying mainly
on Hill.”207 The Act, however, had several key differences from Hill,
including that (a) Hill applied to all medical facilities, while the
Massachusetts law applied only at abortion clinics; (b) Hill applied equally
to all speakers, while the Massachusetts law exempted speakers from the
clinics; and (c) Hill was limited to unwanted speech, while the
Massachusetts law criminalized all speech (other than by clinic speakers)
within the zones, even if the speech was invited by the listener.208 The
district court found that the Act even prohibited merely wearing T-shirts
with “abortion-related” messages on them while legally passing through the
zone to go elsewhere.209
The First Circuit did not believe that any of these differences mattered at
all. After beginning with the familiar “principal inquiry” language from
Ward, the First Circuit dismissed these differences from Hill as immaterial.
203. Cf. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986) (holding an
ordinance content neutral because it “is aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult
motion picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the
surrounding community” because the Government’s proffered interest was not
“predominant[ly]” content based).
204. Indeed, these decisions presumably would allow the schools to ban the message on
the sign in Mosley itself (“Jones High School Practices Black Discrimination”) yet allow
pro-school messages (“Jones High School Is Great!”). See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 93 (1972). This approach therefore turns content neutrality on its head,
allowing government preference of certain messages in precisely the way Mosley said was
impermissible.
205. 571 F.3d 167, 178 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (June 24, 2013)
(No. 12-1168). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in McCullen and will hear the
case in early 2014. McCullen, 133 S. Ct. at 2857. One of us (Rienzi) is counsel of record for
the speakers in that case.
206. McCullen, 571 F.3d at 177–78.
207. Id. at 176.
208. Compare MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266 § 120E1/2(a), (b)(1)–(2), (d), (f) (LexisNexis
2007), with Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726–27 (2000).
209. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 F. Supp. 2d 382, 423 n.294 (D. Mass. 2008) (finding
that “displaying signs or shirts with abortion-related or partisan messages clearly qualifies”
as a violation of the law, even for passersby who may otherwise legally walk through the
zones).
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The court explained: “it suffices to say that the mere fact that a contentneutral law has a disparate impact on particular kinds of speech is
insufficient, without more, to ground an inference that the disparity results
from a content-based preference.”210 For this reason, and relying on prior
buffer zone cases in the circuit, the court found the Massachusetts law
content neutral.211
The First Circuit’s neutrality decision defies the standard contentneutrality inquiry, and even defies the weakened version of that inquiry as it
was conducted in Hill. In particular, the legislature’s decision to allow
speech on the public sidewalks by abortion clinic employees, but not by
their pro-life opponents, is obviously impermissible.212 As the Supreme
Court found in Mosley, the government does not have the authority to
“grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but
deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views.”213 In fact, the Court in Hill—which itself applied a weakened
version of the neutrality inquiry (as discussed supra)—expressly stated that
neutrality requires equal treatment of all speakers:
The statute . . . applies to all “protest,” to all “counseling,” and to all
demonstrators whether or not the demonstration concerns abortion, and
whether they oppose or support the woman who has made an abortion
decision. That is the level of neutrality that the Constitution demands.214

Thus, contrary even to Hill, the First Circuit upheld a law as neutral that did
not apply equally to all speakers in the public forum, and particularly
favored a group of speakers who support the abortion decision.215 As the
district court found, this favoritism was not accidental—rather, the law was
enacted “to make crystal clear . . . that those who work to secure peaceful
access to [the clinic] need not fear prosecution.”216 The law thus does not
provide “the level of neutrality that the Constitution demands,” even under
Hill.
The First Circuit also failed to examine adequately whether the law in
McCullen was “justified without reference to the content of speech.”217
Given the fact that the law permits passersby to walk through the same
210. McCullen, 571 F.3d at 177.
211. Id. at 178.
212. Cf. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (plurality opinion) (finding that a
statute that determines “[w]hether individuals may exercise their free speech rights near
polling places depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a political campaign”
and is a content-based regulation because the law favored some speech and disfavored other
speech).
213. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
214. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725 (2000) (emphasis added).
215. See McCullen, 571 F.3d at 176–77.
216. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 F. Supp. 2d 382, 406 (D. Mass. 2008). The trial court
also concluded that the exemption was permissible based on the theory that speakers from
the abortion clinic would be “less likely to engage in directing of unwanted speech” toward
incoming patients. Id. at 407.
217. See McCullen, 571 F.3d at 177 (concluding that to the extent there was a “disparate
impact” on pro-life speech, there was “no more” to suggest that the statute was only justified
by referencing the content of speech).
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zones, and simply prohibits people walking through the zone from also
expressing their views about abortion in the zone, it is impossible to believe
that the government’s justification is unrelated to the content of speech. If
the government’s interest is triggered by a passerby saying “abortion is
bad,” but not a passerby remaining silent or saying “the Red Sox are bad,”
then the interest is clearly related to the content of speech.218
In sum, the law upheld as neutral in McCullen should have been analyzed
as content based because it is content based in its application (some speech
and speakers are permitted, while others can be imprisoned), in its
justification (the legislature clearly believed its interests were not threatened
by silent passersby, or by speakers from one side of the debate), and in its
motivation (a government desire to protect speech offering access to
abortion, but not speech offering access to abortion alternatives). Yet the
First Circuit deemed this government favoritism in its regulation of
peaceful speech on a public sidewalk to be completely neutral, because it
relied on the Renton-driven “principal inquiry” analysis instead of applying
the traditional neutrality tests.219
3. Satellite Television Regulation
In DISH Network Corp. v. FCC,220 the Ninth Circuit considered the
constitutionality and content neutrality of FCC regulations requiring
satellite television providers to carry “qualified noncommercial educational
television stations” on their system.221
In order to be a “qualified noncommercial educational television station,”
a station needs to be eligible for a Corporation for Public Broadcasting
(CPB) grant.222 CPB grants, in turn, impose certain content criteria, namely
that
applicants must devote the substantial majority of their daily total
programming hours to general audience programming that serves
demonstrated community needs of an educational, informational and
cultural nature. Programs that further the principles of particular political
or religious philosophies do not qualify.223
218. As noted in Part I.B, supra, the flag-burning context is comparable. There, the
government’s asserted interests were only threatened by burnings with a certain message,
and the Court thus determined the regulations were content based and subjected to strict
scrutiny. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989). Indeed, the district court found that the plaintiffs were barred from “expressing
their views about abortion”—even “displaying signs or shirts with abortion-related or
partisan messages” would violate the law. McCullen, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
219. The First Circuit’s decision is now in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s recent
conclusion in Hoye v. City of Oakland. See 653 F.3d 835, 851 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The City’s
policy of distinguishing between speech that facilitates access to clinics and speech that
discourages access is not content-neutral. It is the epitome of a content-based speech
restriction.”). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the McCullen decision in June
2013. McCullen v. Coakley, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1168).
220. 653 F.3d 771, 778–80 (9th Cir. 2011).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 778 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).

1230

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

The imposition of content criteria for the stations required to be carried in
DISH Network thus distinguished the case from Turner. In Turner, the
majority concluded that the must-carry regulations “do not burden or
benefit speech of a particular content” and therefore could be deemed
content neutral.224 Rather than forcing cable companies to carry channels
broadcasting particular content, the regulations at issue in Turner simply
required the cable companies to carry certain types of channels (i.e., local
broadcast channels), regardless of their programming content.225
Nevertheless, applying the weakened content-neutrality analysis we have
described, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the regulations in DISH
Network were content neutral, even though they required carrying channels
with a government-dictated content (and with government imposed
proscriptions on programming that furthered “particular political or
religious philosophies”).
The Ninth Circuit arrived at this counterintuitive conclusion in familiar
fashion. It began its analysis with the Ward “principal inquiry” formulation
of the neutrality doctrine.226 The court then stated a seemingly neutral
interest: that Congress merely sought to “guard against the influence of
special interests” and “even the playing field” to “prohibit satellite carriers
from ‘discriminating’ against noncommercial stations.”227 The court
therefore found that the law “serves interests unrelated to the suppression of
free expression,” citing Renton.228 Accordingly, the court found that the
regulation “seeks to support expression, not suppress it” and is content
neutral.229
Had the court actually applied the traditional neutrality test, the law
would have been easily classified as content based. First, the law is content
based in its application: the government is ordering the satellite broadcaster
to carry stations with a particular government-required content, and with a
government-imposed limitation on programs with less favored content (i.e.,
those that further “particular political or religious philosophies”). Nor
could the regulations be defended as “justified without reference to the
content of speech.” Indeed, if noncommercial stations carried the exact
same programming as the commercial stations, there would be no
justification for the regulations at all.
In short, even if the regulations in Turner really could be considered
neutral (because they applied to all local broadcasters regardless of
content), there is no plausible argument that the requirements in DISH
Network are content neutral in their application, justification, or motivation.
Nevertheless, applying the weakened neutrality test, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the regulations as neutral.
224. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645 (1994).
225. We disagree with the Court’s neutrality arguments in Turner, for the reasons set
forth above.
226. DISH Network, 653 F.3d at 778.
227. Id. at 779.
228. Id. at 778.
229. Id. at 779.
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4. Parade Permitting
Reasonable people might disagree as to whether, as a policy matter, there
are good reasons for wanting to allow school districts somewhat greater
authority over the messages on student clothing than we would accept in
other contexts. But the broader danger of cases like Palmer and Jacobs
(discussed in Part III.B.1, supra) is that the courts are purporting to apply
the standard neutrality analysis—i.e., the same analysis they would and
should provide to core political speech in any sidewalk demonstration or
parade—yet they are creating precedents using the Renton-driven, weaker
content analysis in ways that will inevitably apply more broadly.
This is precisely what has occurred in the Fifth Circuit on the question of
whether the government can single out government favored political
messages for special treatment in parade regulations.
In International Women’s Day March Planning Committee v. City of San
Antonio, the Fifth Circuit recently considered whether a San Antonio parade
permit scheme was content neutral or content based.230 Under the scheme,
organizers of most parades were required to pay government-imposed fees
for police and cleanup activities.231 The city decided, however, that there
were certain parades which it wanted to exempt from these requirements.
Therefore, the fees were not applicable to certain parades, including parades
to celebrate Martin Luther King Jr. Day and Veterans Day.232
The plaintiffs in the case—who were seeking a permit for a parade to
celebrate International Women’s Day—argued that the scheme was content
based, in that the city was preferring parades with certain governmentapproved messages, but charging fees to other marchers.233
Using the Renton-inspired “principal inquiry” analysis, the court
nevertheless deemed the scheme entirely neutral, even though it expressly
found that the law was designed to favor certain messages in the public
forum. The court reasoned that the city was not trying to suppress anyone’s
message, but instead had “singl[ed] out a limited number of favored
messages for special treatment.”234 The court found this was permissible
under Palmer, its school dress code case discussed above.235
This approach is flagrantly content based under all three aspects of the
traditional content analysis. First, the preference is content based in
application: parades with certain government-approved messages and
themes receive free use of the streets while others must pay. Second, the
preference is obviously not justified without reference to the content of
speech—indeed, the content of speech was the very reason the city wanted
to waive fees for certain parades. And third, as even the Fifth Circuit’s
230. Int’l Women’s Day March Planning Comm. v. City of San Antonio, 619 F.3d 346
(5th Cir. 2010).
231. Id. at 350.
232. Id. at 353.
233. Id. at 354–55.
234. Id. at 361.
235. Id.
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analysis demonstrates, the law is intended to identify “favored messages”
which will be “singl[ed] out” for “special treatment” in the regulation of the
public forum.236 Thus, the law also has an obviously content-based
motivation.
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis should be shocking. The core, blackletter
teaching of the quintessential content-neutrality case—Police Department
of Chicago v. Mosley—is that the government cannot “grant the use of a
forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.”237 Yet here
the Fifth Circuit is deeming content neutral a law that the court openly
acknowledges to be designed to “single out . . . favored messages” and give
them preferential treatment in the public forum. Moreover, the court
arrived at this result not with express application of the secondary effects
doctrine, but by purporting to use the standard content-neutrality analysis,
which has been warped over time.
5. Counterexample: Hoye v. City of Oakland
Despite the cases discussed above, there remain courts of appeals
decisions that avoid the doctrinal pitfalls discussed in Part II. The Ninth
Circuit’s recent decision in Hoye v. City of Oakland238 provides a useful
example.
In Hoye, the Ninth Circuit confronted an abortion clinic statute modeled
on the Colorado law upheld by the Supreme Court in Hill. Like the law in
Hill, the Oakland statute on its face applied to all speakers, including
speakers from abortion clinics.239 However, the City of Oakland enforced
the law in a discriminatory way: it treated all speakers offering access to
abortion as automatically exempt, while it treated speakers offering access
to abortion alternatives (such as adoption) as covered by the law.240 This is
the same type of speaker discrimination that was written into the
Massachusetts statute upheld as neutral by the First Circuit in McCullen.
Unlike the First Circuit, however, the Ninth Circuit did not apply the
weakened, Renton-driven content-neutrality analysis described in the cases
above.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit correctly found that Oakland’s
preferential treatment of some speakers on the public sidewalk “is the
epitome of a content-based speech restriction.”241 The court reached this
conclusion by applying the traditional application inquiry described in Part
I above (“a regulation is content-based if . . . the regulation, by its very

236. Id. at 361.
237. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
238. 653 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2011).
239. Id. at 851.
240. Id. at 850–51 (“At oral argument, the City confirmed that it would not enforce the
Ordinance against an escort who approached a patient, without consent, and said, ‘May I
help you into the clinic?’ but that it would enforce it against a sidewalk counselor who said,
‘May I talk to you about alternatives to the clinic?’”).
241. Id. at 851.
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terms, singles out particular content for differential treatment”)242 and by
reciting the familiar, pre-Renton standard from Mosley that the government
“may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views.”243
IV. SEVERAL PATHS TO RESTORING THE CONTENT-NEUTRALITY TEST
The very idea that the government would “single out favored messages”
to receive special treatment on public streets and sidewalks should strike
any judge as obviously impermissible under First Amendment content
analysis. Indeed, this is the precise opposite of the neutrality test as applied
in Mosley, the paradigmatic content-neutrality case.244 Yet three judges on
the Fifth Circuit, in 2010, apparently saw no problem with the government
regulating speech content in this way. And judges in the other circuit courts
and justices on the Supreme Court have recently made similar errors in the
other contexts described above.
We believe the only explanation for courts viewing these speech
restrictions as “neutral” is that they are no longer applying the standard
content-neutrality inquiry. Instead, they are applying a severely weakened
neutrality analysis, which has been subtly distorted over time by the
secondary effects doctrine. The result is that courts tend to be satisfied by
the mere assertion of a neutral-sounding motive, and allow that neutralsounding motive to crowd out other aspects of the neutrality inquiry,
including a focus on the law’s application and justification.
In this regard, the secondary effects doctrine is having the precise impact
feared by its early critics. It is creating the opportunity for governments to
“single out favored messages” legally. And whether this government
favoritism occurs in parades, on public sidewalks near abortion clinics, on
television, or in public schools, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals
are frequently allowing the favoritism to occur without triggering strict
scrutiny. So long as the government is savvy enough to couch the state
interest as neutral, there is a good chance a court can be convinced to find
the law neutral. In this manner, the content-neutrality inquiry is functioning
less like “the keystone”245 holding First Amendment doctrine together, and
more like a roadmap for governments to regulate speech selectively based
on its content and even viewpoint while avoiding the compelling interest
test.
This is a serious problem in First Amendment doctrine and application.
As the Court has repeatedly acknowledged, viewpoint discrimination is “an
egregious form of content discrimination,” and the government should
242. Id. (alternation in original) (quoting Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051
(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
243. Hoye, 653 F.3d at 851 (citing Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1128 (9th
Cir. 2005)).
244. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 4, at 115 (deeming Mosley “perhaps the seminal decision
distinguishing content-based and content-neutral restrictions”).
245. Kagan, supra note 15, at 449.
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never be permitted to engage in it.246 Yet as the recent cases discussed
above demonstrate, the courts of appeals are often using the weakened
content-neutrality analysis even to permit viewpoint discrimination in the
public forum.
The good news, however, is that the problem is not yet universal, and the
harm from the doctrinal shift described above can be addressed.
The optimal way to address the problem is for the Supreme Court to take
a case—or series of cases—to address directly the doctrinal damage created
by the secondary effects doctrine. Doing so would require several steps.
First, the Court should grant certiorari in a case to clarify that the express
use of the secondary effects doctrine is limited to so-called “low value”
speech and cannot be applied beyond that context. The Court should look
for a case that expressly invokes the doctrine in the context of core political
speech. As discussed in Part II.A.3 supra, these cases do arise from time to
time.
Second, the Court should also clarify—in the next content-neutrality case
it decides—that the “principal inquiry” statement from Ward is a
misstatement. What the Court presumably meant was that the “principal
target” of the content inquiry is laws that discriminate based on
disagreement with the message. But calling an analysis of motive the
“principal inquiry” confuses means with ends. As Justice Kagan rightly
noted, a content-neutrality inquiry that focuses on such direct inquiries into
motive is avoided too easily to do any real work. The Court’s recent grant
of certiorari in the McCullen case offers an opportunity to make this
correction.
Third, the Court should also correct its obvious overstatement from Ward
that a law is neutral so long as it serves “purposes unrelated to the content
of expression.” A law that bans all civil rights marches would of course
protect some purposes unrelated to the content of expression, as it would
reduce litter and traffic congestion. But the law would still be obviously
content based and should be treated as such.
Fourth, the Court should correct its past statements suggesting that
Renton offers a valid example of a law that is “justified without reference to
the content of speech.” The entire point of the secondary effects doctrine is
that there are certain effects that come with speech of a certain content.
Thus Renton’s secondary effects approach should rightly be viewed as an
exception to the justified without reference inquiry. Allowing Renton to
continue to be used in this regard essentially allows the secondary effects
doctrine to be read into the rest of the neutrality inquiry in a way that no
majority of the Court has ever embraced.
There are good reasons to believe that the Supreme Court would be
prepared to make these corrections and directly address the problems that

246. “The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (emphasis
addded).
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are becoming apparent in the courts of appeals. Over the past several years,
the Court has taken a variety of cases to clarify questions of First
Amendment doctrine.247 Furthermore, with Justice Kagan’s arrival, the
Court now also has within its midst a prominent academic critic of allowing
the neutrality inquiry to be a direct inquiry into motive.248
If the Supreme Court does not address the doctrinal problems directly,
lower courts still have some room within existing case law to apply a proper
content-neutrality inquiry. Because the doctrinal problems we have
discussed have occurred subtly, they have left in place a host of strong
content-neutrality cases that have never been overruled and are still widely
accepted as valid law. Thus, courts confronted with content-neutrality
questions are perfectly able to rely upon Mosley, O’Brien, Eichman,
Johnson, Clark, and other cases that do not use the weakened content
analysis described above. This is how the Ninth Circuit in Hoye reached
the correct result on the abortion clinic speaker question (the Ninth Circuit
relied on the principles from Mosley) while the First Circuit erred (because
it applied the weakened Renton-driven content approach and ignored
Mosley). The Supreme Court’s decision last term in Sorrell provides yet
another example of a strong content analysis, which lower courts can and
should use as a model going forward.
Nearly three decades ago, when the Court announced the secondary
effects doctrine, it was widely believed that doctrine would severely
undermine the First Amendment. As detailed above, it has done so, just
more slowly and quietly than most commentators have realized. The
damage has occurred through Supreme Court decisions that, whether
deliberately or not, incorporated the secondary effects approach into the
standard content-neutrality inquiry. The Court needs to take deliberate
action now to reverse that damage and restore the neutrality test to its
proper strength.

247. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); Snyder v. Phelps,
131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010); Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
248. See Kagan, supra note 15, at 443.

